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
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**MATHEMATICAL
PRINCIPLES
OF
THEOLOGY,
OR, THE
Existence of GOD**

Geometrically Demonstrated.

In THREE BOOKS.

WHEREIN IS PROVED,

The Existence of GOD from Eternity to Eternity; his Self-existence, Independency, and Unity. That GOD is infinite in Wisdom, Power, Knowledge, &c.

A L S O,

That MATTER is a temporary Being; that GOD is the Cause of its Existence, and of the Existence of all other Beings, that ever did, or can exist; and upon GOD the Continuation or Termination of their Existence depends.

B Y

RICHARD JACK,

Teacher of MATHEMATICKS.

L O N D O N :

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Fleet-street. MDCCLXVII.

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TO THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE

HUGH Earl of *Marchmont*.

MY LORD,

PERmit me to take this opportunity of publicly acknowledging the many favours you have been pleased to confer upon me, a stranger to your Lordship, till by the infatuati-
on of men rebelling against their lawful Sovereign, I was
drove from my native country,

A 2 rendered

rendered destitute of all probable means of support, and ruined by the resentment of the rebels, for readily serving his Majesty to the utmost of my ability, when his forces were attacked at *Seaton*. In that distress your Lordship's friendship was my only comfort; your character, to which I was not a stranger, gave me indeed a title to your protection, as the best recommendation to you, is suffering in the cause of liberty, and of the protestant succession; that was my introduction to your Lordship,
that

DEDICATION.

v

that procured me your friendship, which I shall ever value as my greatest happiness.

The work which I present to your Lordship, has also some title to your favourable acceptance, the subject of it is important; a demonstration of the existence of the fountain of truth, must be acceptable to a person who is an eminent lover of truth; your Lordship's wonderful proficiency in mathematical knowledge, which I admired whilst I had the honour of reading mathematicks with you, ren-

ders you the fittest patron of the following geometrical demonstrations.

If they have the happiness to meet with your Lordship's approbation, I need be under no apprehension of any censure from the publick. I am

Your Lordship's

most obliged,

and most obedient

humble servant,

London, Oct. 7.
1746.

RICHARD JACK.

P R E F A C E.

Although the knowledge of truth, in itself highly valuable, be difficult to attain, yet every man, who seriously reflects upon what passes within himself, must acknowledge, that he is possessed of faculties, by the due exercise whereof he may acquire it; such as thought, perception, and the power of comparing ideas, and of determining, in pursuance of such comparison, or the faculties of reasoning and judging.

How man came to be endued with those faculties, may appear perhaps

not so easy to determine, but if a very simple maxim be allowed, which no man in his right senses ever denied,

That nothing exists without a cause, it will necessarily follow, that those human faculties are owing to some being, and since we discover in ourselves no power capable to produce them, we must ascribe them to some other existing being able to bestow them.

If we also take a view of all around us, and observe the immensity, harmony, and beautiful variety displayed in the universe, from the most stupendous fabrick to the smallest microscopical insect, each of them proclaiming power, wisdom, and design in their author; how preposterously absurd would it be to imagine, that man had faculties bestowed upon him,

him, far exceeding the properties of inanimate beings, surpassing the variegated beauties of the finest vegetables, or the exquisite structure of the smallest insects, without any design in the giver, or use in the exercise of them; since then the Creator of man has invested him with such noble powers, it is his duty to employ them to the best purposes.

It is true, our bountiful Creator has given us also a will, whereby we may choose the object for the exercise of our faculties, but he has given us reason too, in order to direct our choice, and conduct us in the pursuit of such ends as terminate in solid pleasure and lasting happiness. And what excites more pleasing sensations? what inspires with more elevated thoughts? what more enlarges those thoughts,

P R E F A C E.

thoughts, than a diligent inquiry after truth? Nothing is more beneficial to man, nothing tends so directly to his lasting happiness, as the knowledge of truth.

By the impartial search after truth, we are made acquainted with our frailties and imperfections, we discover wherein our conceptions are erroneous; to that we owe our knowledge of the arts and sciences, so eminently beneficial to mankind; but above all, from thence we may have the existence and attributes of the benevolent Creator of all things demonstrated to us; he gave and continues our existence, upon him we depend, and in him we ought to place our only confidence; it is from his infinite adorable perfections alone that we can hope for lasting happiness.

The

P R E F A C E.

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The discovery of truth then being of the utmost importance to man, both with respect to his condition here, and his state hereafter, it is certainly the most proper, if not the only proper subject of our thought and inquiry; nature incites us to the search, and rewards our thirst after knowledge with the highest satisfaction when we obtain it; the applause too, which usually attends every discovery according to the useful consequences of it, is perhaps no slight motive to excite men to inquire; a new construction of a mathematical problem, or demonstration of a theorem, is eagerly embraced by the learned, and the author esteemed, though perhaps few useful consequences attended it, fewer still were foreseen by the discoverer, and some remained undiscovered by the

the learned who applauded him. How much more excellent and praise-worthy must that enquiry be, which has the demonstration of the existence of Almighty God for its end, and a permanent impression of his being and attributes on the minds of men for its consequence? since by the firm belief of that great truth we enjoy prosperity and support affliction; from the conviction of his existence, and the knowledge of his government, delight, cheerfulness, and consolation flow; hope is given here, and hereafter never ceasing happiness.

But the greater the benefit arising from the knowledge of any truth is, the greater caution should be used in inquiring after it, every step must be attentively considered, that the mind may be compelled to assent to every pro-

proposition, each demonstration must be clear and perspicuous, and the conclusions drawn justly and certainly.

Truth is only attainable by slow steps, of this all mathematicians are sensible, men who with impartiality and the utmost caution have studied it; all their geometrical discoveries have proved, that truth is known only by degrees; the care and attention these men use in investigating the most plain and simple truths is apt to surprise others, there no party prejudices, no views of private interest take place; they search for truth alone, and embrace it wherever they find it.

It would have been happy for mankind, if the metaphysicians had observed the same method in their enquiries, then they could not have imposed upon the world and themselves,

selves, nor have drawn fallacious conclusions from uncertain premises; their principles must have been demonstrated, and the many mischiefs occasioned by their failure in proving these principles, would have been avoided.

That mathematical conclusions are certain, and metaphysical consequences doubtful, is not so much owing to the different nature of the demonstrations, as to the different methods taken in their prosecution; mathematicians begin with affixing names to particular things, and constantly apply these names to the same things; metaphysicians not only differ amongst themselves in the explanation of their terms, but use the same terms in different senses upon different occasions, rendering them ambiguous at all times.

Meta-

Mathematicians next proceed to axioms, or self-evident truths, carrying conviction with them, and from thence to propositions, plain and simple in their nature, and enantiated with precision, until they have obtained a clear apprehension of a sufficient number of truths to enable them to investigate those originally in view, but difficult to demonstrate; carefully avoiding ambiguity in their expressions, and every thing which does not arise from the hypothesis, construction, or a preceding definition or axiom in their demonstrations: they never rashly hurry to any proposition, nor precipitately involve themselves in a difficult or intricate demonstration of any abstruse truths, although they had them in view from the beginning, and they were the end of their enquiry.

quiry. Thus it becomes impossible for mathematicians to impose upon the world; thus knowledge is obtained with certainty, and every possible mistake or error may, with the utmost facility, be discovered and removed.

But in metaphysics the case is far otherwise, those who have hitherto employed themselves in that study, generally affect more precipitation than attention, and in the very outset bewilder themselves in propositions dark, difficult, and complicated, the expressions not precisely known, and without any previous steps fitted to found a demonstration upon; where definitions or axioms are used, they are of no service to the discovery of truth by the ambiguity of the expressions, and the various senses in which they are understood and applied, consequently

frequently the first step in a demonstration built upon them becomes fallacious; every subsequent proposition is equally defective; and no conclusion can be relied upon which is deduced from this pompous but erroneous appearance of reasoning. Hence some men have been emboldened to undertake the defence of the most absurd principles; immense metaphysical volumes wrote as answers, amount only to tedious wrangling about the different senses each writer has been pleased to affix to certain sounds, whilst truth and knowledge are buried or forgot, and science itself is brought into dispute.

That even some metaphysicians are conscious of these imperfections, is manifest from their writings; one great instance may be observed in the per-

formance of a very learned and eminent author, who attempts to prove the non-existence of matter after the manner of metaphysicians, to construct the world by a metaphysical fable, either that there is nothing too absurd to be demonstrated by that method of writing, or that no demonstration of any truth is to be expected from it.

As the geometrical method of enquiry is universally allowed to be the most just, it has been thought by learned men that it would be a great advantage to mankind if any means could be found to adapt it to morality. Mr. Locke thought morals so evidently demonstrable, that he says, the negligence or perverseness of mankind cannot be excused if their discourses in morality be not much more clear than

than this in natural philosophy*. But when we find that distinct writer afterwards doubting his ability to perform that service to the world†, and consider the diversity of opinions still prevailing (perhaps more than could be imagined) upon moral questions of the highest concernment, we might be induced to suspect that it was not possible to apply geometrical reasoning to moral subjects, notwithstanding the great opinions to the contrary, when really the neglect of that method hitherto is only to be attributed to the difficulty of finding a proper medium for applying geometrical demonstration to moral truths. For if a being really does exist, to say the existence of that being cannot

* Locke Hum. Und. B. 3. Chap. 11. §. 16. 17.

† Locke's Letters.

be truly demonstrated, is indirectly to deny that it does exist, and to contend that the most just method of demonstration is not applicable to the nature of that being, amounts to this absurdity, that truth may be ambiguously demonstrated, but not justly.

If we pursue with slow attentive steps the path which nature points out to us, we may be assured we shall be conducted to a just conclusion, and find the means to demonstrate in the strictest manner the existence of what really does exist; for every thing existing is endued with properties suited to its nature, and by the knowledge of those properties we distinguish one being from another; and therefore if by fitting conclusions from a just demonstration, we can acquire the knowledge of the properties of any being,

we

we discover the existence of that being.

That nature is most uniform and simple in all her operations, is an axiom allowed by all philosophers, and since we have been enabled to arrive at the knowledge of the distinguishing properties of many beings, and to demonstrate some truths geometrically, if by continuing the same tract there be one other existing being, whose properties we cannot learn, nature must cease to be uniform in her operations contrary to the axiom, or that existing being must have no properties, which is absurd.

To believe a stop put to the acquisition of knowledge, is shocking to the mind of man, which naturally thirsts after knowledge; to think that because a thing has not yet been done, it is impossible to reach it, seems

seems an indolent submission to ignorance, in which it is happy for us our predecessors did not acquiesce.

There are innumerable instances, where an honest endeavour to discover truth has brought it to light with such shining marks, as rather to surprise us that it was not sooner found, than that it was discovered so late. All truths are in their existence equal, the reason why one is admitted, another questioned, is not that one truly exists and not the other, but because one has been pointed out to us by such plain striking steps, as to compel our assent, and the other attempted to be shown by means dark and uncertain, leaving the mind hesitating and in suspense, till unable to discover steps to prove it equally plain and perspicuous with the former; it subsides into a disbelief of its

its existence, and thence spring those controversies which distract the minds of many, and eminently disturb the happiness of society.

These considerations excited me to apply my thoughts to a geometrical demonstration of morality, convinced that nothing could be of more use to mankind than the success of such an undertaking, and in the prosecution of my design I have observed the strict demonstrating method of Euclid, and have endeavoured to be equally just and perspicuous.

In what I now offer to the publick, I have (as it was necessary I should, in treating of morals,) demonstrated the existence of the ALMIGHTY GOD, BLESSED FOR EVER, that he is a self-existing and independent being, that he from all eternity did,

did, and in all eternity will exist. I have demonstrated his unity, infinite in power, wisdom, knowledge, and justice, &c. That matter is a temporary being, and that GOD is the cause of its existence, as he is the cause of the existence of all other beings which ever did or can exist; and that upon GOD their existence depends.

Upon these great truths are morals founded, and if this method of treating that subject meets with approbation, I shall be encouraged to proceed with the remaining parts demonstrated in the like manner; but if it should please GOD to dispose things so as to disable me from the performance, I hope this attempt will excite other geometers to improve upon the thought, and apply themselves to a subject so deserving our serious attention,

tion, and so conducive to the happiness of mankind, and then we may hope to see our moral principles as clearly demonstrated as the principles of geometry.

Before I conclude, it is necessary to inform the reader, that I have been obliged in some places to cite The doctrine of proportion geometrically demonstrated, which I intended to have published at Edinburgh before the present work; but the late wicked and unnatural rebellion having forced me to leave my native country, and the rebels having pillaged my house, the manuscript of that book was, with my other effects, taken away, or destroyed. I hope therefore the reader will excuse my citing
b *that*

that manuscript, as it is not in my power to offer it to the public until it is wrote again, which I hope soon to be able to do.

E R R A T A.

- | Page | Line | |
|------|------------------------|---|
| 21. | 14. | in the margin, read ax. 4. |
| 38. | 9. | <i>dele</i> it. |
| 44. | 3. | for dependent of B. r. dependent upon B. |
| 102. | 16. | <i>dele</i> is the cause. |
| 119. | 7. | in the margin, r. ax. 3. Ditto l. 15. in the margin, r. ax. 3. |
| 120. | 18. | in the margin, r. ax. 3. |
| 127. | 6. | after them, r. in the same time |
| 130. | 17. | in the margin, r. ax. 3. |
| 135. | 10. | for B. r. C. |
| 140. | 7. | in the margin, r. ax. 3. |
| 155. | 17. | after alone, r. and is destroyed by the conjunct acting of both powers. |
| 161. | 6. | for C's power, r. B's power. |
| 170. | 4. | in the margin, r. ax. 9. l. 1. |
| 171. | 15. | r. prop. 10. of this. |
| 176. | 7. | r. C D. |
| 178. | 5. | r. C D. |
| 240. | 1. | r. determining. |
| 260. | <i>dele</i> , D, F, E, | in the fig. to prop. 6. |
| 263. | 16. | r. of beginning the existence of any one dependent being. |
| 290. | 9. | r. the being B. |
| 311. | 14. | r. of some other being. |

THE
EXISTENCE
OF
G O D

Geometrically Demonstrated.

BOOK I.

DEFINITIONS.

I. **A**NY thing, that ever was,
is, or can be, is said to have
existed, to exist, or will exist.

II. A being is any thing, that ever
did, does, or will exist.

B

III.

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III. Being is the same with existence.

IV. The limits of any thing, are its utmost ends, or boundaries.

V. Finite, is that which has certain and determined limits, or boundaries.

VI. Hypothesis, is what is allowed, or supposed to be, or to exist.

VII. Assigned, is the same with given: Therefore when any thing is said to be assigned, the same is understood, as if that had been said to be given.

VIII. Infinite, is greater than any finite that can be assigned, or it is
that

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that which has no limits or boundaries.

IX. *Body, is what is solid, extended, and capable of motion.*

X. *Space, place, and time, are divided into absolute and relative.*

XI. *Absolute space, is such as is extended, similar, and immoveable, whose parts cannot be separated, nor even distinguished from one another.*

This definition of space, is supposing it different from matter or body. For, if we suppose all existent matter annihilated, the immense space which it did possess, will remain the same after the annihilation, as it was before.

And since it is conceived to consist in extension alone, it evidently will be similar in all its parts. Neither can it be moveable, nor its parts separated; because that would necessarily suppose it endowed with the attribute of solidity, to make it capable of receiving an impressed force, in order to excite that motion, or separation of its parts, of which in this definition it is supposed to be void.

Neither can its parts be distinguished from one another, because the different parts of any being, are only presented to our senses, by the interposition of some signs or marks; but space consisting only of extension, none of its parts can be distinguished, by our senses, but by the interposition of some bodies, which we must make use of

of as marks or signs to distinguish its parts by. But those parts of space, which lie between two or more bodies, or are possessed by body, constitute relative, and not absolute space, as will appear from a following definition.

Whether a being consisting of extension only, exists in nature or not, does not affect this definition, it being sufficient that we can form to ourselves an idea of such a being.

This definition exactly corresponds with that of a circle, a square, a triangle, &c. given us by geometers, who define them by their properties, without informing us whether they actually exist or not; and as it suffices, for them to form an idea of these figures, from their properties by which they define them; so it is equally sufficient for us to form an idea of abso-

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lute space, from its properties by which it is here defined.

XII. Relative space, is either that part of absolute space, which any body possesses, and in this respect it is the same with absolute place; or it is that particular part of absolute space, which lies between two or more bodies. This last species of relative space, will not always remain the same; for if the distance and position of the bodies to which it relates be encreased or diminished, then will the relative space be also increased or diminished.

Although bodies containing equal quantities of matter, will possess equal spaces, however they may differ in their form or figure, yet the ambient space contiguous to their bounding surfaces will not be the same. Thus two
bodies,

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bodies, each containing a quantity of matter equal to 10 cubic feet, the one in the form of a cube, the other in that of a sphere, will possess equal spaces; but the space ambient to their surfaces, will be different, as the surfaces are of different figures.

Wherefore relative space may justly be defined to be the measure of absolute space, by the means of body, since it is by body that any part of absolute space is determined.

XIII. *Absolute place, is that particular part of absolute space, which a body possesses.*

The absolute place of a body is always the same in magnitude, though it is not necessary for it always to be the same numerically.

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For if we suppose the earth to move, the space it occupies, will always be the same in magnitude; but as it continually changes its place, by its motion, therefore it must pass through different parts of absolute space, and consequently cannot have the same place numerically.

XIV. *Relative place, is that part of space, which we perceive any body to possess, with respect to its situation, position to, and distance from any other body.*

Hence it follows, that a body may constantly change its absolute place, and its relative place may remain the same; that its absolute place may remain the same, and its relative place be perpetually changing, or both may constantly change.

For

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For first, if we suppose a passenger on board a ship, and the ship in motion, but he at rest, his relative distance and position with respect to all the parts of the ship, will remain the same; consequently he will retain, with respect to these parts, the same relative place; but the ship being in motion, he will, in common with her, constantly change his absolute place.

Again, let us suppose the sun at rest, and his absolute place the same; but the planets moving round him in ellipses's, at different distances, with different degrees of velocity, the sun then will be constantly changing his distance and situation to them, and consequently changing his relative place, whilst his absolute place is the same, because he is fixt.

That

That a body may change both its absolute and relative place is so obvious, that it needs no illustration.

XV. Duration, or absolute time, is such as constantly flows with the same equable tenor, without any respect, or relation, to the motion of any body whatsoever. Wherefore, if all the bodies in the universe, from the creation, had been absolutely at rest, the same duration, that has passed, would have elapsed, independent of the motion of existing bodies, or of their rest, and even of the existence of bodies themselves.

And since duration would have existed, proceeding in its regular successive order, whether these had existed or not, therefore duration is similar in all its parts. And as a mathematical

tical line is conceived to be generated, by the motion of a mathematical point, and bounded with points; so any finite part of duration may be conceived to be generated, by the uniform flowing of a point of duration, and bounded by points of duration.

XVI. A point of duration, is what constitutes no part of duration, however small; but is only the limit or boundary of a part of duration. For as a mathematical point is defined to be what has no length, and can only be conceived to be the limit or boundary of a mathematical line, and an infinite number of them cannot constitute length; so a point of duration may in the same manner be justly defined, to be what constitutes no part of duration, but is only the limit or boundary

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dary of a part of duration, and an infinite number of them cannot make up any part of duration.

XVII. Relative, or apparent time, is a finite part of duration considered as bounded by points of duration, and has the same relation to absolute time, that relative space has to absolute space; and therefore it may be defined to be the measure of duration, by the means of body. For as the different parts of space, cannot by our senses be distinguished without the interposition of some body; for the same reason the different parts of time cannot be perceived but by the interposition of some body, which we may suppose moving with a regular and uniform motion; so that the motion of the body corresponds, and is proportional

I

tional to the different parts of duration, and by this means time may be determined. Thus we measure the particular part of time, that any body continues in the same place, whether that place be absolute or relative; or that part of time which any body takes, to move from any determined place to another, with an uniform and equable Motion.

XVIII. *Eternity, is infinite duration, or time, greater than any time that can be assigned.*

XIX. *The nascent existence of any being, is that point of duration in which its existence begins.*

XX. *The evanescent existence of any being, is that point of duration, in which its existence terminates or ends.*

XXI.

XXI. *A being, antecedent to whose nascent existence a point of duration can be assigned, is a temporary being.*

XXII. *An act of any being is the exertion of that power, by which it presses upon, or influences itself, or any other being.*

XXIII. *An effect, is the consequence arising from any being pressing upon, or influencing itself, or any other being, in any manner whatsoever.*

XXIV. *A being is said to be instrumental in producing an Effect, when it acts in conjunction with some other being for the production of that effect.*

XXV.

XXV. *The cause of an effect, is a being pressing upon, or influencing itself, or any other being, whereby that consequence or effect is produced.*

XXVI. *A self-existing being, is such whose existence is independent of all other beings whatsoever.*

XXVII. *A dependent being, is a being whose existence is the effect of some other being.*

XXVIII. *The mind, is that being, which is capable of thinking, perceiving, judging, and reasoning.*

XXIX. *An idea, is any being which exists in the mind.*

XXX.

XXX. *An agent, is a being which acts, and is the cause of an effect.*

XXXI. *Agent is divided into animate and inanimate, free and not free.*

XXXII. *An absolutely free agent is a being self-existing, and acting at all times, without the influence of any other being whatsoever.*

XXXIII. *A relative free agent, is a being which is not self-existing, but may act without the immediate influence of any other being.*

XXXIV. *A dependent or secondary agent, is a being which is neither self-existing, nor at any time can act,*

act, without the influence of some other being.

XXXV. *An animated agent is, any being that can receive ideas, whether absolutely or relatively free, or even dependent.*

PROPOSITION

XXXVI. *An inanimated agent is, a being which can receive no ideas, and upon all occasions, times, and circumstances, is a dependent or secondary agent.*

XXXVII. *A being is said to act, when it presses upon, or influences itself or any other being, in any manner whatsoever.*

XXXVIII. *That power is said to terminate the existence of any being,*
C *which*

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which acting upon the being, will destroy the effect arising from the exertion of the power whereon its existence depends.

A X I O M S.

I. **N**othing hath no properties.

II. No effect can be produced without a cause.

III. Effects produced are in proportion to the causes that did produce them.

IV. Every being exists in all the points of time, or duration in which it acts.

V.

V. *The * consequence of any action,** Def. 23.
is both posterior in time and in our ideas, to the action itself.

VI. *No being can exist and not exist at the same time.*

VII. *Every being which contains another being, is greater than that which it contains, and this holds equally with respect to space and duration.*

That is, any space is greater than another space contained within it.

And any duration is greater than that time, whose bounding points of duration are within it.

VIII. *Any being may exist in all the points of duration, in which it is acted upon, by the exertion of that*

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power on which its existence depends; nothing acting in opposition to it, so as to destroy its effect.


That is, if the life of any animal depends upon the regular circulation of the Blood, and Secretion of other juices, so long as the animal is actuated by that regular motion and secretion, nothing acting upon the animal to destroy their effects, the life of the animal may be continued.

IX. *The existence of any being cannot both be dependent, and independent of the same being.*

X. *The existence of every being is either dependent, or independent of some other being.*

XI. *Effects are dependent upon the causes which produced them.* XII.

XII. *Two equal contrary powers or causes pressing upon or influencing the same being in the same point of duration, mutually destroy each other's effect.*



PROPOSITION I.

THEOREM I.

A being cannot act before it exists.

FOR, if it was possible for any being to act before it existed; then, because every being exists in every point of duration in which it acts*, therefore in the time that the* Ax. act was performed, it must have existed. But by the hypothesis, at that time it had no existence, where-

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fore it will both exist and not exist
† Ax. 6. at the same time, which † is absurd.

Therefore, *a being cannot act before it exists*, which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION II.

THEOREM II.

The existence of the cause of any effect is antecedent to the existence of that effect.

• Def. 23. **B**Ecause that effect * is the consequence arising from that being, which is the cause of it, pressing upon, or influencing itself, or any other being; wherefore that pressing upon, or influence, will be antecedent to the effect †; and since that pressing

pressing upon, or influence, is the acting of the being †, that being, † Def. 22. therefore, will act antecedent to that effect. But every being exists in all the points of duration in which it acts ||, consequently that being will exist prior to that effect. But that being is the cause of the existence of that effect §. Ax. 4. § Hypoth.

Therefore, the existence of the cause of any effect, is antecedent to the existence of that effect, which was to be demonstrated.

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PROPOSITION II.

THEOREM III.

A being cannot be instrumental in its own existence.

FOR, let A be any being; I say, that A cannot be instrumental in its own existence. For if it be possible for A to be instrumental in its own existence, then will the existence of A be an effect produced, by the acting of the being A, in conjunction with some other

* Def. 24. being *, which let be B. Then will that conjunct acting of the beings A and B, be the cause of the existence of A. But the existence of the cause of any effect is antecedent to

to the existence of that effect †, where † Prop. 2.
 fore the conjunct acting of the be-
 ings A and B, will be antecedent to
 the existence of A, and consequently
 A will act antecedent to its own ex-
 istence, and therefore will act before
 it exists, which is absurd ‡. ‡ Prop. 1.

Therefore, *a being cannot be in-
 strumental in its own existence, which*
was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION IV.

THEOREM IV.

*The existence of any temporary being,
 is dependent on some other antece-
 dent existing being.*

FOR, let A represent any tem-
 porary being; I say,
 that the existence of A, A ○
 is dependent on some other
 being

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being that exists antecedent to it ; for, if the existence of A, be not dependent on some other being that exists antecedent to it, it will either be instrumental in its own existence, or not ; but no being can be instru-

* Prop. 3. mental in its own existence * : Therefore the being A, cannot be instrumental in its own existence. Now

because the existence of the being A, is neither dependent on some other antecedent existing being, nor can be produced by itself ; then will the existence of A, be an effect produced without a cause, which is absurd †.

† Ax. 2. Wherefore since the existence of A, is an effect, which is owing to some cause, and it is demonstrated, that that cause cannot be itself, it will be owing to some other being. But the existence of that cause is antecedent

to

to the existence of the effect * ; * Prop. 3.
wherefore the being that is the cause
of the existence of the being A, will
exist antecedent to A, and conse-
quently the existence of the tempo-
rary being A, is dependent on some
other antecedent existing being.

Therefore, *the existence of any tem-
porary being, is dependent on some other
antecedent existing being, which was
to be demonstrated.*

PROPOSITION V.

THEOREM V.

*A time cannot be assigned in which
nothing existed.*

FOR, if it be possible to assign
a time wherein nothing existed,
the existence of the first being, since
it

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§ Def. 2. it must be a temporary being §, will
 be dependent on some other antec-
 • Prop. 4. dent existing being *. But by the
 hypothesis no being exists, conse-
 quently it will be possible, for the
 existence of a temporary being, to be
 independent on any antecedent exist-
 † Prop. 4. ing being, which is absurd †.

Therefore, *a time cannot be af-
 signed in which nothing existed, which
 was to be demonstrated.*

PROPOSITION VI.

THEOREM VI.

Some being existed from all eternity.

FOR, if no being existed from
 all eternity, then may a time
 be assigned in which nothing existed,

† Prop. 5. which is absurd †.

There-

Therefore, *some being existed from all eternity, which was to be demonstrated.*

PROPOSITION VII.

THEOREM VII.

A time cannot be assigned antecedent to an infinite time past.

FOR, if it be possible to assign a time antecedent to an infinite past time; then will that interval of time, intercepted between the first point of duration of the time assigned, and the last point of duration, that passes when we conceive it, be an assigned finite duration *.

* Def. 5.

And because the first point of duration of that assigned time, is antecedent to the infinite past time †;

† Hyp.

I and

and the point of duration that passes at the conception of it, is posterior to the same infinite past time ; therefore the infinite past time will be contained within the boundaries of that assigned finite time. But every being is greater than that other being which it contains within it *, equally in respect to space and duration ; consequently that assigned finite time, will be greater than the infinite past time : a finite greater than an infinite, which is absurd †. From this absurdity it follows,

* Ax. 7.

† Def. 8.

That a time cannot be assigned antecedent to an infinite past time, which was to be demonstrated.

THEOREM VIII.

... of the ...

* Def. 5.

I

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posterior to the infinite time to come *; therefore the infinite time to come, will be contained within the boundaries of that assigned finite duration. But every being is greater than that other being it contains within it, both with respect to space and duration.†

• Hyp. † Ax. 7. Wherefore that assigned finite duration will be greater than an infinite time to come, and consequently a finite will be greater than an infinite, which is absurd.‡

‡ Def. 8. Therefore, a time cannot be assigned posterior to an infinite time to come, which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION IX.

THEOREM IX.

A time cannot be assigned, either antecedent or posterior, to infinite time past and to come.

LET A B, represent an infinite time past

and to come, and

C, the point of

duration that passes

at the conception of it, then will

CA, represent the infinite time past,

and CB, will represent the infinite

time to come. Wherefore because

CA, is infinitely continued back-

ward *, no time can be assigned an-


tecedent to A †; Also because CB is †

infinitely continued forward ‡, no time ‡

can be assigned posterior to B §.

D

But



* Hyp.

† Prop. 7.

‡ Hyp.

§ Prop. 8.

But it has been already proved, that no time can be assigned antecedent to A, and now it is demonstrated, that no time can be assigned posterior to B, consequently no time can be assigned either antecedent or posterior to the time A B. But A B represents infinite time past and to come.

Therefore, *a time cannot be assigned, either antecedent or posterior, to an infinite time past and to come, which was to be demonstrated.*

Coroll. From hence it follows, that no time can be assigned, either antecedent or posterior to eternity past and to come. Because eternity is infinite time*; therefore eternity past and to come, will be the same thing with infinite time past and to come.

* Def. 18.

And

And as a time cannot be assigned either antecedent or posterior to infinite time past and to come *; * Prop. 9. consequently no time can be assigned either antecedent or posterior to eternity past and to come.

PROPOSITION X.

THEOREM X.

Any being, whose existence depends upon any other being, will, in some manner, be pressed upon, or influenced by that other being.

FOR, let A be a being, whose existence depends upon some other being, A 
which let be B; I say, B 
that the being A, will, in
some manner, be pressed upon, or in-
D 2 fluenced

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fluenced by the being B. For since the existence of the being A depends upon the being B*, the existence of A, will be an effect whereof the being B is the cause†. But an effect is the consequence, that arises from any being pressing upon or influencing itself, or any other being‡; wherefore the existence of the being A, is owing to the being B pressing upon, or influencing it; consequently the being B does press upon or influence the being A.

Therefore, *any being, whose existence depends upon any other being, is, in some manner, pressed upon or influenced by that other being*, which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XI.

THEOREM XI.

Any being, whose existence depends on any other being, cannot exist without the existence of that other being.

FOR, let the existence of the being A depend on the being B; I say, that A $\odot$ it is impossible for A to B $\square$ exist, without the existence of B. For since the existence of A depends on the being B[†], the conti-^{† Hyp.} nation of A's existence is an effect whereof B is the cause; but an effect is the consequence that arises from any being pressing upon, or influencing itself or any other being*, * Def. 23.

D 3 where-

wherefore the continuation of the being A's existence, is owing to the being B, pressing upon or influencing it, and consequently the whole time that A exists, it will be pressed upon or influenced by B. Again, if we suppose the existence of B to be terminated, and A continue, if possible, to exist, after it it is impressed, or influenced by the last exertion of that power in B, A  at its evanescent existence, B  then will A continue to exist independent of B, or will continue to be pressed upon or influenced by it. But A cannot exist independent of B, for if it could, the existence of A would be independent of B, which is absurd*.

* Hyp.

Neither can it be pressed upon or influenced by B, for if it could, then
every

every being existing in all the points of duration in which it acts*, the being B would exist posterior to its evanescent existence, and consequently would both exist, and not exist at the same time, which is absurd†. † Ax. 6.

Wherefore since the being A cannot exist independent of the being B, nor can be influenced or pressed upon by it after its existence is terminated, the being A will not at all exist after the existence of the being B is terminated, and consequently A cannot exist without the existence of B.

Therefore, *any being, whose existence depends upon any other being, cannot exist without the existence of that other being, which was to be demonstrated.*

PROPOSITION XII.

THEOREM XII.

The existence of any being, that cannot exist, without the existence of some other being, depends on that other being.

LET A be a being which cannot exist, without the existence of some other being, as B; I say, that the existence of the being A is dependent on B. A  B 

For the existence of A does either depend on the being B, or not; and first, if possible, let the existence of A not depend on the being B. Then because the existence of the being A, is an effect, it will be owing
ing

Geometrically Demonstrated. 41.

ing to some cause *, which cause * Ax. 2.
 will therefore either be itself, or some
 other being different from the being B:
 Consequently the existence of A will
 be dependent on the pressure, or in-
 fluence of itself, or some other being
 for the continuation of its existence.

Let therefore the existence of the
 being B, be supposed to
 be terminated : Then be A ○
 cause the exertion of that B □
 power, on whose pressure,
 or influence, the existence of the
 being A depends, is not exerted by
 the being B †, therefore the being † Hyp.
 A may be actuated by that pressure,
 or influence, on which its existence
 depends, posterior to the terminating
 of the existence of the being B.

But any being may exist in all the
 points of duration in which it is actu-
 ated

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ated by that pressure, power, or influence on which its existence depends *, nothing being here supposed to destroy that effect; therefore the being A, may exist posterior to the existence of the being B, that is, it may exist without the existence of B, which is absurd †. Wherefore the existence of the being A, can neither be dependent on itself, nor any other being different from B.

Consequently the existence of A will either be dependent on B, or upon no being whatsoever. If it be dependent on no being, then will A be a self-existing being §, which is contrary to the hypothesis, and absurd.

Therefore, *any being that cannot exist without the existence of some other being, its existence depends on that other being*, which was to be demonstrated.

P R O-

PROPOSITION XIII.

THEOREM XIII.

Any being, whose existence is independent of another being, may exist without the existence of that other being.

LET A and B be any two beings, and let the existence of the being A, be independent of the being B.

I say, that A may exist A $\odot$
 without the existence of B $\square$
 B: For A may either exist
 without the existence of B, or not.
 If the being A cannot exist without the existence of B, then because any being that cannot exist without the existence of some other
 being,

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being, it's existence is dependent on
Prop. 12. that other being; therefore the existence of A is dependent of B, which
† Hyp. is absurd†. Wherefore the being A can exist without the existence of the being B.

Therefore, *any being, whose existence is independent of another being, may exist without the existence of that other being*, which was to be demonstrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XIV.

THEOREM XIV.

Any being, that can exist without the existence of another being, its existence is independent of that other being.

LET A and B be any two beings, and let A be such a being, as can exist without the existence of B. A ☉ B □

I say, that the existence of A, is independent of B: For the existence of A will either be dependent on B, or not. Let the existence of A, if possible, be dependent of B. But any being, whose existence depends on another being, cannot exist without the existence of that

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•Prop. 11. that other being *. Therefore the being A cannot exist without the
§ Hypoth. existence of the being B. But A § can exist without the existence of B, consequently the existence of A is both dependent, and independent of
† Ax. 9. the same being B, which is absurd †. Wherefore the existence of A is not dependent on B; and therefore is independent of it.

Therefore, the existence of any being, that can exist without the existence of some other being, is independent of that other being, which was to be demonstrated.

P R O-

PROPOSITION XV.

THEOREM XV.

A self-existing being can exist, without the existence of any other being whatsoever.

FOR, let A represent a self-existing being: I say, that the being A can exist, A  without the existence of B  any other being whatsoever.

For, if it be possible, let the being A be supposed not capable of existing without the existence of any other being. And let any being be assigned, without whose existence A cannot exist, and let that being be B. Now because A cannot exist without

• This
Hyp.

without the existence of B*: But the existence of any being, that cannot exist without the existence of some other being, is dependent on

†Prop. 12. that other being †: Therefore the existence of the being A is dependent on the being B. But the being A is

† First
Hyp.

a self-existing being †, and therefore its existence is independent of any other

‖ Def. 26. being whatsoever ‖. Wherefore the existence of A is both dependent, and independent of the same being

§ Ax. 9. B, which is absurd §. Therefore the being A may exist, without the existence of the being B, and consequently without the existence of any other being whatsoever.

Therefore, *a self-existing being can exist, without the existence of any other being whatsoever*, which was to be demonstrated.

P R O-

PROPOSITION XVI.

THEOREM XVI.

The existence of any being that is not self-existing, is dependent upon some other being.

FOR let A be a being, that is not self-existing. I say, that the existence of A, is dependent upon some other being.

Because the existence of A $\odot$ every being is either dependent or independent of some other being*. Therefore the existence of* Ax. 10. A, is either dependent upon some other being, or not.

If the existence of A be not dependent upon any other being, then will A be a self-existing being†, con-† Def. 26.

E

trary

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trary to the hypothesis, which is absurd; consequently the existence of A, is dependent upon some other being.

Therefore, *the existence of any being that is not self-existing, is dependent upon the existence of some other being; which was to be demonstrated.*

PROPOSITION XVII.

THEOREM XVII.

A being which can exist, without the existence of every other being whatsoever, is a self-existing being.

FOR, let A represent a being which can exist without the existence of every other being whatsoever. I say, that A is a self-existing being.

For,

For, if A is not a self-existing being, then will its existence be dependent upon some other being *, and let that other being be B. Then because the existence of A is dependent upon the being B; therefore A cannot exist without the existence of B†, contrary to the hypothesis, †Prop. 11. which is absurd. Wherefore the existence of the being A, is independent of the being B, and after the same manner it may be demonstrated, that the existence of A is independent of any other being. But a being, whose existence is independent of all other beings, is a self-existing being‡; wherefore the being A is a self-existing being. ‡Def. 26.

Therefore, *a being which can exist, without the existence of every other*
E 2 being

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being whatsoever, is a self-existing being; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XVIII.

THEOREM XVIII.

A being cannot begin, or continue to exist antecedent to, or without the exertion of that power on which its existence depends.

FOR, let A be any being: I say, it is impossible for A to begin, or continue to exist, without the exertion of that Power, on which its existence depends. For, if possible, let A begin to exist without the exertion of that power; then, because the beginning of A's existence is an effect, and effects are dependent upon the causes that did produce them;

them* ; wherefore the exertion of* Ax. 11.
 that power on which A's existence
 depends, is the cause of the begin-
 ning of its existence ; but it begins to
 exist without the exertion of that
 power † : Therefore the beginning † Hyp.
 of A's existence will be an effect pro-
 duced without a cause, which is ab-
 surd ‡. Neither can A continue to ‡ Ax. 2.
 exist, without being pressed upon,
 or influenced by that power ; for if
 it could, there would still be an effect
 produced, to wit, the continuation
 of A's existence without a cause,
 which is absurd § ; and consequently § Ax. 2.
 by the non-exertion of that power,
 the existence of A will cease.

Therefore, *no being can begin, or
 continue to exist, antecedent to, or
 without the exertion of that power
 on which its existence depends ; which
 was to be demonstrated.*

PROPOSITION XIX.

THEOREM XIX.

The existence of any being may be terminated, or continued, by the exertion or non-exertion of that power that is capable of terminating it.

LET A and B be two beings, and B possessed of such a power, that can terminate the existence of A; I say, that the existence of A, may be terminated or continued, by the exertion or non-exertion of that power, which B possesses. Because, if A be pressed, or influenced, by that power which B possesses, in the same point of duration, in which it is actuated, by that power on which
its

its existence depends; then will the being A be actuated in the same point of duration, by two equal and opposite powers, which therefore will mutually destroy each other's effect * : * Ax. 12. and Def. 38.

Wherefore, since the effect that flows from the exertion of that power, by which the existence of the being A is continued, is destroyed, the existence of A will thereby terminate; for if it does not, there will be an effect produced, to wit, the continuation of the existence of the being A, without a cause, which is absurd †. † Ax. 2.

Therefore, by the exertion of that power which B possesses, the existence of A will terminate, and consequently by the non-exertion of that power, A may be actuated by that power on which its existence depends, nothing then acting in opposition to it, so as

E 4 to

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to destroy its effect; wherefore the
 • Ax. 8. existence of A may be continued*.

Therefore, *the existence of any being may be terminated, or continued, by the exertion or non-exertion of that power that is capable of terminating it; which was to be demonstrated.*

PROPOSITION XX.

THEOREM XX.

The existence of any being, is independent of that being, which cannot be the cause of beginning its existence, nor act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect.

LET A and B be two beings, and
 let B be such a being as
 cannot be the cause of be- A ○
 beginning the existence of B □
 A, or act in opposition to that

that cause, so as to destroy its effect.

I say, the existence of A is independent of B. For since B cannot be the cause of beginning the existence of A, therefore A may begin to exist without the existence of B, and consequently the existence of

A in this respect, will be A 

independent of the existence of B. Again, let C B 

be a third being, that can C 

bring A into existence: Wherefore,

the beginning of A's existence will be an effect, of which the exertion

of that power that C possesses, is the

cause *; and since B is possessed with ^{* Def. 23. and Construction.}

no power in opposition to, or that

can destroy the consequence that

flows from the exertion of that power

which C possesses †: Therefore, the † Hyp.

consequence that flows from C's ex-

erting

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etting of that power, cannot be affected by the existence or non-existence of B, and consequently the existence

Prop. 14. of that effect is independent of B.

But that effect is the beginning of

† Hyp. A's existence†, wherefore the beginning of A's existence, that is the existence of A, is independent of the being B.

Therefore, *the existence of any being, is independent of that being, which cannot be the cause of beginning its existence, or act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect; which was to be demonstrated.*

PROPOSITION XXI.

THEOREM XXI.

The existence of any being, is dependent on that being, which can be the cause of beginning its existence, or act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect.

LET A and B be two beings,
 and let B be such
 a one, as can be the cause A $\odot$
 of beginning the existence B $\square$
 of A, or can act in op-
 position to that cause, so as to de-
 stroy its effect. I say, that in both
 these respects, the existence of A is
 dependent on B. For first, since B
 can be the cause of beginning the
 existence of A *, B will be possessed Hypoth.
 with

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with such a power, that by the exertion of it, A will begin to exist; and consequently the beginning of A's existence will be an effect, of which the exertion of that power

† Def. 23. that B possesses is the cause †; but effects are dependent on the causes

‡ Ax. 11. that did produce them ‡. Wherefore the beginning of A's existence is dependent on B's exertion of that power it possesses; that is, the existence of the being A, is dependent on the being B.

Again, let B be such a being, which though it cannot be the cause of beginning A ⊙ the existence of A, yet B □ can act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy the effect. I say, that the existence of the being A, in this respect, is dependent

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dent on B. For since the being B can exert a power opposite, and equal to that power, that brings A into existence *; therefore these two • Hyp. equal and contrary powers being exerted at the same time will mutually destroy each other's effect †; • Ax. 12. wherefore by the acting of these opposite powers, A cannot begin to exist, consequently the beginning of A's existence, is wholly dependent on the non-exertion of that power which B possesses, in opposition to that power that will be the cause of the beginning of A's existence; wherefore in this respect the existence of A is dependent on the being B.

Therefore, the existence of any being, is dependent on that being; which can be the cause of beginning its existence, or act in opposition to that

*that cause, so as to destroy its effect ;
which was to be demonstrated.*

PROPOSITION XXII.

THEOREM XXII.

If the existence of any being be independent of another being, that other being cannot be the cause of beginning its existence, or act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect.

LET A and B be two beings,
and let the existence
of A, be independent of A $\odot$
B. I say, B cannot be the B $\square$
cause of beginning the
existence of A, or act in opposition
to that cause, so as to destroy its
effect. For if it were possible for
B either to be the cause of the be-
ginning

Geometrically Demonstrated. 63

ginning of A's existence, or act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect, the existence of A would be dependent on B *, which * Prop. 21. is absurd †; wherefore B can neither † Hyp. be the cause of beginning the existence of A, or act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect.

Therefore, if the existence of any being, be independent of another being, that other being cannot be the cause of beginning its existence, or act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect; which was to be demonstrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XXIII.

THEOREM XXIII.

If the existence of any being be dependent upon another being, that other being may be the cause of beginning its existence, or act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect.

LET A and B be two beings, and let the existence of A be dependent upon B. I say, that B may be the cause of beginning the existence of A, or act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect. For, if B can neither be the cause of beginning the existence of A, nor act in opposition to that cause, so as

A ⊙

B □

to destroy its effect. In both these respects, the existence of A will be independent of B*, which is absurd†: Wherefore B may either be†^{Hyp.} the cause of the beginning of A's existence, or act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect.

Therefore, if the existence of any being, be dependent on another being, that other being may be the cause of the beginning of its existence, or act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XXIV.

THEOREM XXIV.

The existence of any being is independent of any other being, that can neither be the cause of continuing its existence, nor act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect.

LET A be any being, and B another being, which can neither be the Cause of continuing A in its existence, nor act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect. I say, the existence of A is independent of B.

For since B can exert no power, that is capable of continuing A in its existence,

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existence, nor act in opposition to that power *, * Hyp.


Therefore A may be actuated by that power on which its existence depends, whether B exist or not. But any being may exist in all the points of duration, in which it is acted upon by that power on which its existence depends, nothing being supposed to act in opposition to it, so as to destroy its effect †: Wherefore A may exist, † Ax. 8. without the existence of B. But the existence of any being is independent of that other being, without whose existence it can exist §. Wherefore § Prop. 14. the existence of the being A, is independent of the being B; *which was to be demonstrated.*

F 2 *Otherwise.*

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Otherwise.

Let CD represent
any portion of time,
and E the point of
duration that passes
at the termination



of the effect of the exerted power on
which the existence of A depends. If
that being should exert that power
no more, the existence of A would
terminate in the point of dura-
tion E; for if the existence of A
does not terminate in the point of
duration E, then there will be an
effect produced, to wit, the continua-
tion of A's existence, without a cause,
which is absurd *. But if the being
that possesses that power should again
act, then will the same point of du-
ration

* Ax. 2.

ration E be the first point of time that A will begin to be again influenced by that act; and therefore in that point of time A may be considered as beginning to exist. But B cannot act in opposition to that power *; *^{Hyp.} and the existence of any being is independent of that being which cannot be the cause of beginning its existence, nor act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect †: †^{Prop. 20.} Wherefore the existence of A is independent of B.

Therefore, the existence of any being, is independent of any other being, that can neither be the cause of continuing its existence, nor act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XXV.

THEOREM XXV.

The existence of any being, is dependent on some other being, that can be the cause of continuing its existence, or act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect.

LET A and B be two beings, and let B be such a being that can be the cause of continuing A in its existence, or act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect. I say, that the existence of A, in both these respects, is dependent on B. For because B can exert a power that will be the cause of continuing A in its existence* ; wherefore the con-

* Hyp.

continuing of A in its existence, is an effect, of which the exertion of the power that B possesses is the cause *. * Def. 23.

But effects are dependent on the causes that did produce them † : There- † Ax. 11.

fore the continuing of A's existence, is dependent on the exertion of that power, which B possesses, and consequently the existence of A, in this respect, is dependent on the being B. Again, let B be such a being, which though it cannot be the cause of continuing the existence of A, yet can act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect. I say, that the existence of A is still dependent on B. For since B can exert a

power opposite and equal A 

to that power that can B 

continue A in its exi-

stence ‡ ; therefore these two equal ‡ Hyp.

F 4

and

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and contrary powers exerted at the same time, will destroy mutually each

- Ax. 12. other's effect * ; wherefore by the exertion of these two opposite powers, A will cease to exist. Consequently the continuation of A's existence, is dependent on the non-exertion of that power, which B possesses, in opposition to that power, that can be the cause of continuing it in its existence; that is, the existence of A, in this respect, is dependent on the being B.

Therefore, *the existence of any being, is dependent on that other being, that can be the cause of continuing its existence, or can act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect; which was to be demonstrated.*

P R O-

PROPOSITION XXVI.

THEOREM XXVI.

If the existence of any being, be independent of another being, that other being cannot be the cause of continuing its existence, nor act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect.

LET A and B be two beings,
and let the existence
of A be independent of B. A ⊙
I say, that B cannot be B □
the cause of continuing A
in its existence, nor act in opposition
to that cause, so as to destroy its
effect.

2

For, if B can be the cause of continuing A in its existence, or act in oppo-

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opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect, then will the existence
• Prop. 25. of A be dependent on B *, which is
† Hyp. absurd †.

Therefore, if the existence of any being, be independent of another being, that other being cannot be the cause of continuing its existence, nor act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect ; which was to be demonstrated.

This and the preceding proposition, may also be demonstrated in the same manner with the second demonstration of the twenty fourth proposition.

P R O-

PROPOSITION XXVII.

THEOREM XXVII.

If the existence of any being be dependent on another being, that other being may be the cause of continuing its existence, or act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect.

LET A and B be two beings, and let the existence of A be dependent on B. I say, that B may be the cause of continuing the existence of A, or may act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect. For if B cannot be the cause of continuing the existence of A, or act in opposition to that cause, so as

A ○

B □

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to destroy its effect ; then will the
 * Prop. 24. existence of A be independent on B* ;
 † Hyp. which is absurd †.

Therefore, if the existence of any being, be dependent on another being, that other being may be the cause of continuing its existence, or act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect ; which was to be demonstrated.

Otherwise.

Let CD represent A ○
 any portion of time, B □
 and E the point of C E D
 duration that passes — | —
 at the terminating of
 the effect, of the immediate preceding
 exertion of that power on which the
 existence of A depends. Then if the
 being

being that possesses that power should act no more, the existence of A would terminate *, and that in the point of ^{*Prop. 18.} duration E. But if it does, then will the same point of duration E, be the first point of time, that A will begin to be influenced by that act, and consequently A may be considered in that point of time as beginning to exist. But the existence of A is dependent on B †; wherefore B may ^{†Hyp.} either be the cause of beginning the existence of A, or act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect ‡. But that cause is here demon- ^{‡Prop. 23.} strated to be the same cause that continues A in its existence; consequently B may either be the cause of continuing A in its existence, or act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect.

There-

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Therefore, if the existence of any being, &c. which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XXVIII.

THEOREM XXVIII.

The existence of any being, is independent of any other being, that cannot be the cause of terminating its existence.

FOR, let A and B be two beings, and let B be such an one, as cannot be the cause of terminating the existence of A. I say, the existence of A is independent of B. For because B cannot terminate

the existence of A *; therefore B cannot act in opposition to that cause, that

• Hypoth.

that is capable of continuing the existence of A, so as to destroy its effect. Wherefore the existence of A is independent of B*.

*Prop. 24.

Therefore, *the existence of any being, is independent of any other being, that cannot be the cause of terminating its existence; which was to be demonstrated.*

PROPOSITION XXIX.

THEOREM XXIX.

The existence of any being, is dependent on that other being, that can be the cause of terminating its existence.

FOR, let A and B be two beings,
and let B be such a
being that is capable of ter- A ⊙
minating the existence of B □
A. I say, that the exist-
ence of A is dependent on B.

For

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• Hyp. For because B is capable of terminating the existence of A*; and therefore B can act in opposition to the cause that is capable of continuing A in its existence, so as to destroy its effect: Consequently the existence of A is dependent on B †.

Therefore, *the existence of any being, is dependent on that other being, that can be the cause of terminating its existence*; which was to be demonstrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XXX.

THEOREM XXX.

Any being, whose existence is independent of any other being, that other being cannot be the cause of terminating its existence.

FOR, let A and B be two beings,
and let the existence
of A be independent of B. A ○
I say, that B cannot be B □
the cause of terminating
the existence of A. For because the
existence of A is independent of B*; * Hyp.
therefore B cannot act in opposition
to that power, which may be the
cause of continuing the existence of
A, so as to destroy its effect†; where- † Prop. 26.
fore B cannot terminate the existence
of A.

G

There-

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Therefore, *any being, whose existence is independent of any other being, that other being cannot be the cause of terminating its existence; which was to be demonstrated.*

PROPOSITION XXXI.

THEOREM XXXI.

Any being, whose existence depends on any other being, that other being may be the cause of terminating its existence.

FOR, let A and B be two beings, and let the Existence of A be dependent on B. I say, that B may be the cause of terminating the existence of A. For because the existence of A is dependent

A ○

B □

pendent on B * ; therefore B may act * Hyp.
 in opposition to that power which is
 the cause of continuing the existence
 of A, so as to destroy its effect †. †Prop. 27.
 Consequently B may be the cause of
 terminating the existence of A.

Therefore, any being, whose existence depends on any other being, that other being may be the cause of terminating its existence ; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XXXII.

THEOREM XXXII.

A being cannot act after its existence is terminated.

LET A be any being : I say, it is impossible for
A ⊙
B DE C
— | | —
G 2 the

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the being A to act after its existence is terminated. For let BC represent any portion of time, and D the point of duration when the existence of A is terminated, and DC that part of duration that immediately succeeds the termination of A's existence. It is impossible for A to act in any one point of the duration DC; for if it be possible, let it act in the point E. Then because any being, exists in all the points of duration, in which it

* Ax. 4. acts *;

Therefore the being A, will exist in the point of duration E, but its existence terminated in the point of duration D†; therefore A will both exist and not exist in the same point of duration E, which is absurd ‡.

† Hyp.

‡ Ax. 6.

Therefore, *a being cannot act after its existence is terminated*; which was to be demonstrated. P R O-

PROPOSITION XXXIII.

THEOREM XXXIII.

An action of any being cannot be compleated in one point of duration only.

BEcause, however small a time, an action of any being may be conceived to be compleated in, it will have a beginning and ending, and therefore one point of duration at least will exist between these two extreams: Wherefore the smallest part of duration, that an action of any being can be compleated in, will at least consist of three points of duration.

Therefore, *an action of any being cannot be compleated in one point of duration only*; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XXXIV.

THEOREM XXXIV.

A being cannot act in the point of duration in which its existence is terminated, in opposition to that power that continues it in its existence, so as to destroy its effect.

LET A be any being, and BC a portion of time, D that point of it in which the existence of A is terminated. I say, it is impossible for A to act in the point of duration D, in opposition to that power, which continues its existence, so as to destroy its effect. For, if it be possible for A to act in the point



point of duration D, in opposition to that power which continues A in its existence, so as to destroy its effect, then will the termination of A's existence be an effect of which the acting of A in the point of duration D is the cause *. And because * Def. 23. the existence of A is terminated in the point D †; therefore A cannot † Hyp. act after the point of duration D †: † Prop. 32. But that action is begun in the same point D §; wherefore that action of § Hyp. A will be completed in the point of duration D only, which is absurd ||. || Prop. 33.

Therefore, a being cannot act in the point of duration, in which its existence is terminated, in opposition to that power which continues its existence, so as to destroy its effects; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XXXV.

THEOREM XXXV.

Every being will be actuated by a power, in opposition to that power which continues its existence in the points of duration, immediately antecedent to its termination, and in the point of duration in which its existence is terminated.

LET A be any being, and BC any portion of time, and let D be the point of duration that terminates its existence, and E, G, H, &c.



these points of duration immediately antecedent to D. I say, that A will be

be actuated by a power in opposition to that power that continues it in its existence in the points of duration H, G, E and D. For if A be not actuated in the points of duration H, G, E and D, in opposition to that power that continues it in its existence, and the existence of any being, is dependent on that being that continues it in its existence *. But A not being ^{* Prop. 25.} actuated in the points of duration H, G, E and D, in opposition to that power on which its existence depends †; therefore A may be actuated in the points of duration H, G, E and D, by that power on which its existence depends, without any being acting in opposition to it, so as to destroy its effect; wherefore the existence of A will be continued in the points of duration H, G, E and D †, † Ax. 8.
and

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and cannot terminate in any of them,
 •Hyp. but it terminates in D*: which is
 absurd. Therefore the being A will
 be actuated in the point of duration
 D, by a power, in opposition to that
 power, which continues it in its ex-
 istence. It will also be actuated by
 the same power in the points H, G, E,
 which are the immediate antecedent
 points to the last point of duration
 that terminates its existence; for if
 not, then will that action, which ter-
 minates the existence of A, be com-
 pleted in the point of duration B,
 †Prop. 33. which is absurd †. Wherefore the
 being A will be actuated in the points
 of duration H, G, E, by a power, in
 opposition to that power which con-
 tinues it in its existence.

Therefore, *every being will be ac-
 tuated by a power, in opposition to
 I that*

that power, which continues its existence in the points of duration, immediately antecedent to its termination, and in the point of duration in which its existence is terminated; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XXXVI.

THEOREM XXXVI.

That being, which is the ultimate cause of terminating the existence of any other being, will act in opposition to the cause that continues its existence in the points of duration, immediately antecedent to its termination, and in the point of duration in which its existence is terminated.

LET

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LET A and A 
 B be two B 
 beings, CD any C HGFE D
 portion of time,
 and let B be the

cause of terminating the existence of
 A, and E the point of duration in
 which its existence is terminated,
 and F, G, H, &c. the immediate an-
 tecedent points of duration to E. I
 say, that B will act in the points of
 duration F, G, H, &c. in opposition to
 the cause that continues A in its
 existence. For because the existence
 of A terminates in the point of du-
 ration E * ; therefore A will be ac-
 tuated by a power, in opposition to
 that power that continues it in its
 existence in the points of duration
 H, G, F and E †. But that actuating
 of A, is the pressing on or influencing
 of

* Hyp.

† Prop. 35.

of it, by the power which B possesses, and that pressing on or influencing of A, is the acting of the being B ‡. Wherefore the being B acts ‡ Def. 37. in the points of duration H, G, F and E, which are the immediate antecedent points to, and the last point of duration that terminates the existence of A,

Therefore, that being, which is the ultimate cause of terminating the existence of any other being, will act in opposition to the cause that continues its existence in the points of duration, immediately antecedent to its termination, and in the point of duration in which its existence is terminated, which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XXXVII.

THEOREM XXXVII.

*A being cannot be the ultimate cause,
which terminates its own existence.*

FOR, if any being can be the ultimate cause of terminating its own existence, it will act in the immediate antecedent points to, and the last point of duration that terminates its existence, in opposition to that power that continues it in its existence * ; and consequently will act in the point of duration that terminates its existence, in opposition to that power that continues it in its existence, so as to destroy its effect, †Prop. 34. which is absurd †.

There-

Therefore, *a being cannot be the ultimate cause, which terminates its own existence; which was to be demonstrated.*

PROPOSITION XXXVIII.

THEOREM XXXVIII.

That being, antecedent to whose existence a time can be assigned, is a dependent being.

LET A be any being, antecedent to whose existence a time can be assigned. I A 
say, that A is a dependent B 
being. For, because a time can be assigned antecedent to A's existence*; therefore A is a temporary* Hyp.
being†. But the existence of any † Def. 21.
temporary being, is dependent on
some

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some other being existing antecedent
 † Prop. 4. to it †, which let be B. Then be-
 cause the existence of A depends on
 † Hyp. the being B †, but effects are depen-
 dent upon the causes that did produce
 • Ax. 11. them *; therefore the existence of
 A is an effect, of which the being B
 is the cause; but that being, whose
 existence is the effect of some other
 § Def. 27. being, is a dependent being §; there-
 fore A is a dependent being.

Therefore, *that being, antecedent
 to whose existence a time can be as-
 signed, is a dependent being; which
 was to be demonstrated.*

PROPOSITION XXXIX.

THEOREM XXXIX.

That being, antecedent to whose existence no time can be assigned, on which from all eternity existed, is a self-existing and independent being.

LET A represent a being, antecedent to whose existence no time can be assigned, or which from all eternity existed. I say, that

A is a self-existing and independent being. For, if A is not a self-existing being, the existence of A is dependent on some other being *, which if possible let be B; then because the existence of A is dependent on

H

B,

*Prop. 16.

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B, therefore B may be the cause of beginning the existence of.

• Prop. 23. A * ; therefore it is possible for the existence of A  B 

A to have had a beginning, and consequently a time may be assigned antecedent to the existence of A, which is absurd †.

† Hyp. Wherefore the existence of A cannot be dependent on any other being: But a being, whose existence is not dependent on any other being, is a self-existing and independent being †; consequently A is a self-existing and independent being.

† Def. 26.

Therefore, *that being, antecedent to whose existence no time can be assigned, or which from all eternity existed, is a self-existing and independent being; which was to be demonstrated.*

PROPOSITION XL.

THEOREM XL.

*A dependent being cannot have existed
from all eternity.*

LET A be a dependent being.
I say, that A cannot have existed from all A $\odot$
eternity.

For, if it be possible for A to have
existed from all eternity, then no
time can be assigned antecedent to
A's existence * ; but that being, ante-
cedent to whose existence no time
can be assigned, is a self-existing and
independent being † : Wherefore A † Prop. 39;
is a self-existing and independent be-
ing, which is absurd ‡. Consequently ‡ Hyp.
A cannot have existed from all eter-
nity.

H 2 There-

* Cor. to
Prop. 9.

Therefore, a dependent being cannot have existed from all eternity; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XLI.

THEOREM XLI.

A self-existing and independent being existed from all eternity.

LET A represent a self-existing and independent being. A ⊙

I say, that A from all eternity existed. For if A has not existed from all eternity, a time may be assigned antecedent to its existence; but any being antecedent to whose existence a time can be assigned, is a dependent being*; wherefore A is a dependent being, which

is

Geometrically Demonstrated. 101

is absurd*. Therefore no time can ^{Hyp.} be assigned antecedent to A's existence; consequently A existed from all eternity.

Therefore, *a self-existing and independent being existed from all eternity*; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XLII.

THEOREM XLII.

That being, posterior to whose existence a time can be assigned, is a dependent being.

LET A be a being, posterior to whose existence a time can be assigned. I say, A $\odot$ A is a dependent being.

For since a time can be assigned, po-

H 3 sterior

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- Hyp. *terior* to A's existence *, the existence of A will terminate antecedent to that time; but no being can be the ultimate cause of terminating its own existence †; therefore the existence of A will be terminated by some other being. But the existence of any being, is dependent on that being, which can be the cause of terminating its existence †; wherefore the existence of A will be dependent on that other being. But effects are dependent upon the causes that did produce them †; wherefore the existence of A is the effect of that other being on which its existence depends is the cause, consequently the existence of A is the effect of that other being. But that being, whose existence is the effect of some other being, is a dependent being §: Consequently A is a dependent being. There-
- † Prop. 37.
- ‡ Prop. 28.
- † Ax. 11.
- § Def. 27.

Therefore, *that being, posterior to whose existence a time can be assigned, is a dependent being; which was to be demonstrated.*

PROPOSITION XLIII.

THEOREM XLIII.

That being, posterior to whose existence no time can be assigned, or which to all eternity will exist, is a self-existing and independent being.

LET A represent a being, posterior to whose existence no time can be assigned, or which to all eternity will exist. I say, A is a self-existing and independent being. For if A is not a self-existing and independent being, its existence



H 4

will

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will be dependent on some other being §, which if possible let be B. Then because the existence of A is dependent on B; therefore B may be the cause of terminating the existence of A*; and consequently it is possible to assign a time posterior to the existence of A, which is absurd †. Wherefore the existence of A cannot be dependent on any other being. But a being, whose existence is independent of any other being, is a self-existing and independent being ‡; consequently A is a self-existing and independent being. Therefore, that being, posterior to whose existence no time can be assigned; or which to all eternity will exist, is a self-existing and independent being; which was to be demonstrated.

P R O-

PROPOSITION XLIV.
THEOREM XLIV.
*The existence of every dependent being
may be terminated.*

LET A be a dependent being:
I say, that the existence of A may be terminated. $\odot$

For because A is a dependent being *, therefore its existence is the effect of some other being †, and the existence of A will be dependent upon that other being; but that being, on which the existence of any other being depends, can act in opposition to the power that continues its existence §, to as to destroy its effect; wherefore that other being, on which the existence of A depends, can act in opposition to that power that

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that continues A in its existence, so as to destroy its effect; and consequently, by the exertion of that power, the existence of A may be terminated.

Therefore, *the existence of every dependent being may be terminated,* which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XLV.

THEOREM XLV.

The existence of a self-existing and independent being, cannot at any time be terminated, or will to all eternity continue to exist.

LET A represent a self-existing and independent being.

I say, that the existence

of

of A cannot at any time be terminated, or A will to all eternity continue to exist. For, if it be possible for A not to exist to all eternity, then may a time be assigned posterior to its existence: But that being, posterior to whose existence a time can be assigned, is a dependent being*; wherefore A is a dependent ^{*Prop. 42.} being, which is absurd [†]. Consequently the existence of A cannot at any time be terminated, or A will to all eternity continue to exist. ^{† Hyp.}

Therefore, the existence of a self-existing and independent being, cannot at any time be terminated, or it will to all eternity continue to exist; which was to be demonstrated.

From these last eight propositions, it is clearly demonstrated:

First,

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First, That a self-existing and independent being, from all eternity did exist, and to all eternity will exist.

Second, That a being which from all eternity did exist, and to all eternity will exist, is a self-existing and independent being.

Third, That a being which did begin to exist, and whose existence may be terminated, is a dependent being.

Fourth, That a dependent being cannot from all eternity have existed, and may not to all eternity exist.

In this last case it may be observed, that it is neither demonstrated, nor is it intended by the propositions, to prove that the existence of a dependent being, must or will be terminated, but only that it is possible for its existence to be terminated.

The End of the First Book.

THE
EXISTENCE
OF
G O D

Geometrically Demonstrated.



BOOK II.



DEFINITIONS.

I. **R** EASONING, *is comparing the agreement, or disagreement of ideas.*

II. JUDGING, *is the determination of the agreement or disagreement of*
I *compared*

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compared ideas ; or the effect of comparing them.

III. *Willing or volition, is the determination to act or not to act.*

IV. *A self-determining power of any being, is the power of acting according to its own will, without the immediate act of any other being.*

V. *Similar powers or qualities, are those, which are of the same kind, or operate in the same manner ; such as thinking, judging, willing, &c. thus two beings, endued with thinking, judging, willing, &c. are so far said to be possessed of similar powers or qualities, as they both think, judge or will, and so of other powers. But it is not to be understood, that beings*
having

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having similar powers, are therefore possessed of equal powers, or of those powers in the same degree; neither is it necessary, that all the powers each being possessor should be similar, but only each to each, as thought to thought, judgment to judgment, or volition to volition, &c.

VI. Similar and conspiring powers or qualities, are those which exerted in the same time, produce a greater effect than could be produced by the exertion of any one of them; or whose conjunct operation increases the effect; which any one of them in the same time could produce.

VII. Equal similar and conspiring powers or qualities, are those which
exerted

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*exerted at different but equal times;
produce the same effect.*

VIII. *Contrary and similar powers
or qualities, are those which operat-
ing against each other, decrease the
effect which one of them could have
produced if that alone had been ex-
erted, or those which produce a less
effect than might have been produced
by the exertion of the greatest con-
trary power or quality.*

AXIOMS.

A X I O M S.

I. **A**NY being, that ever did, or can exist, was, or will be possessed of some powers or qualities.

II. The existence of any being is terminated, in the same point of duration in which the existence of all the powers or qualities, which it does possess, do terminate. That is, if the life of any animal be wholly constituted, from the motion of the blood, and secretion of other juices; then will the life of that animal terminate in the same point of duration, that the motion and secretion of the blood, and other juices do terminate. Or if matter be supposed to be only possessed of

I solidity,

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
solidity, then will the existence of matter terminate in the same point of duration, in which the existence of solidity is terminated.



LEMMA I.

NO material being can change its magnitude, figure, place, or situation, with respect to other bodies, or the position and situation of the particles that compose it, with respect to one another, without being compelled so to do, by the impression of some external force.

Let A be any material being, either lying on any smooth surface, or sus-



pended in the form of a pendulum ; it is evident that it will remain at rest, in all the points of duration, that no cause intervenes to make it change that state.


And if any other body as B, be in motion, and impinge upon A, then will part of the force that B moved with before the stroke, be communicated to A in the point of duration in which the collision was made, and B after the stroke does not move with the same velocity that it did move with before the stroke. This is evident from all experiments made on material beings.

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LEMMA II.

Matter, or every material being, possesses an inactive quality, by which equally in all directions it resists every alteration or change of its state, with a force proportionable to the quantity of matter that composes that being.

Let A be any body at rest on the plane BC, and D any other body in motion impinging on



Lemma I. A, by this collision the body D will* lose part of the force it moved with before the stroke. That loss of the force that D suffers by the stroke, could not have happened, if A had


not been possessed with an inactive or resisting power, by which it destroys part of the force of D's motion. Because, if there had been no inactivity in the body A, then may the motion of D before the stroke be considered as an existing being; and therefore in the point of duration that the stroke was made, the being D will be actuated by that power that continues it in its motion, nothing acting in opposition to it, so as to destroy either the whole or part of the effect: Therefore the existence of the being, that is, the whole motion, will be continued*. And consequently D will move with the same degree of velocity after, that it did move with before the stroke, in the same direction, and must have

* Ax. 8.
L. 1.

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carried A along with it, however it may differ in magnitude and density from D; which is contrary to all experiments that are made on material beings.

Again, let B be
a very small ma-
terial being, and
A an infinitely



great one, and let C be the force that is necessary, to move B with the Velocity D, then will the motion of B be an effect produced, of which the impressed force C is the cause;

• Hypoth. and since B and C are both finite*, the force that the being B. moves with, is also finite. If the being A be supposed to move with the same

† Hyp. velocity D, then because A is † infinitely

nitely great, the force that A moves with will also be infinitely great, that is, the effect produced by A's motion, will be an infinitely great effect. But effects produced, are in proportion to the causes that did produce them*. Wherefore the force ^{* Ax. 4. L. 1.} that is necessary to move A with the velocity D, will be infinitely great; but since A cannot resist the force of the being B, impinging upon it, that effect will be produced by the finite force with which B moves; that is, a finite force will produce an infinite effect, which is absurd†. Therefore ^{† Ax. 4. L. 1.} the being A, and every material being, possesses a power of inactivity, by which it resists the force of any other being impinging upon it; and that resisting force is proportionable to the quantity of matter that com-

I 4 poses

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poses the body. And since no change can be made on material beings but by motion, and motion is opposed by its resisting power ; therefore, every material being, resists equally in all directions any alteration or change of state whatever that can be made on it, with a force proportionable to the quantity of matter that composes the body.

Corollary 1. From hence it follows, that, if any

body as A,
in the time
B, movethro'
the space C,
by the force



D, it will * require double the force D, to cause the body A to move through double the space C; in

* Ax. 4.
L. 1.

Geometrically Demonstrated. 121

in the same time B, and three times the force D, to cause the body A move through three times the space C, in the time B; and so on of all other multiples and submultiples.

Corollary 2. From this it also follows, that matter acts by the pressure or influence of some other being.

P R O-

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PROPOSITION I.

THEOREM I.

Two, or any number of beings, possessed with equal powers; the effects produced by the exertion of those powers, in different times, are in proportion to each other, as the times in which these powers were exerted.

LET A and B be two beings that are possessed with equal powers, and let C and E represent two different portions of time, and let A by the

A	⊙	C	D
		—	—
B	□	E	F
		—	—

Geometrically Demonstrated. 123


the exertion of the power it possesses, produce the effect D in the time C ; and B, by the exertion of the power it possesses, produce the effect F in the time E ; I say, that the effect D is to the effect F, as the time C is to the time E. For because the powers that the beings A and B possess are equal *, and *^{Hyp.} effects produced are in proportion to the causes that did produce them † ; †^{Ax. 2. L. 1.} therefore in equal times the exertion of the powers will be equal, and consequently the effects produced by the exertion of the powers that A and B possesses, will be equal ; wherefore if the time C be equal to the time E, the effect D will be equal to the effect F.

If the time C be double of the time E, then is the time C divisible into two parts, which let be GH and HK,

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HK, each equal to the time E. Then because the time GH is equal to the time HK,

the effect produced from the exertion of A's power, in the



time GH, will be equal to that produced by the exertion of the same power in the time HK; and since these two effects are equal, their sum will be double one of them, and consequently the effect D, which is produced in the time GK, is double the effect produced in the time GH. But because the time GH is equal to the time E, the effect produced in the time GH, by the exertion of A's power, is equal to the effect F, that is produced by the exertion of B's power; wherefore the effect D, that is pro-

produced by the exertion of A's power in the time C, is double the effect F, that is produced by the exertion of B's power in the time E. Again, if the time C be three times the time E, then will C be divisible into three parts, each equal to E, and consequently the effect D will be thrice the effect F. For the same reason, if the time C be quadruple the time E, the effect D will be quadruple of the effect F; and so on, universally of all multiples. Also, if the time C be half of the time E, then will the time E be divisible into two parts, each equal to the time C, and in the same manner, as before, the effect D will be half the effect F, and if the time C be a third part of the time E, the effect D will be a third part of the effect F; and so universally of all the

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• Def. of
4 Proportions.

the submultiples. Therefore *, whatever proportion the time C bears to the time E, the same proportion will the effect D bear to the effect F. Therefore, *two, or any number of beings, possessed with equal powers, the effects produced by the exertion of these powers in different times, are in proportion to each other, as the times in which these powers were exerted; which was to be demonstrated.*

Corollary. From this Proposition it plainly follows, that if effects produced by the exertion of certain powers, in different times, be in proportion to one another, as the times in which they were produced, the powers, by whose exertion they were produced, are equal to one another.


P R O-

PROPOSITION II.

THEOREM II.

Two, or any number of beings, possessed with different powers, the effects produced by the exertion of them, are in proportion to each other as the powers themselves.

LET A and B be any two beings that are possessed with different powers, and let



C represent any portion of time, and let D be the effect that is produced from the exertion of the power that A possesses in the time C, and E the effect that is produced from the exertion

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exertion of the power that B possesses in the same time C : I say, that the effect D is to the effect E, as the power in the being A is to the power in the being B. For because D and E are the effects produced by the exertion of the powers in the beings A and B in the time C ; if the powers were equal, then would the effect D be equal to the effect E *.

* Prop. 1.
of this.

And if the power in the being A be double the power in B, then will the power in A be divisible into two parts, each of which will be equal to the power in the being B ; and the exertion of these two equal powers in A in the same time C, will produce equal effects, and each equal to the effect E that is produced by the exertion of the power in B, in the same time C † ; and these two equal effects

† Prop. 1.
of this.

Geometrically Demonstrated. 129

effects produced from the exertion of A's power, added together, will be double the effect E ; wherefore if the power in A be double the power in the being B, the effect D will be double the effect E ; for the same reason, if the power in A be triple the power in B, the effect D will be triple the Effect E, and so universally of all multiples. Also, if the power in A be half the power in B, the effect D will in the same manner be proved * to be half of the effect E, and so universally of all other sub-multiples. Therefore †, as the effect D is to the effect E, so is the power that A possesses, to the power that B possesses. Wherefore, *two, or any number of beings, possessed with different powers, the effects produced by the exertion of them in the same time, are*

* Prop. 1.
of this.

† Def. 1.
of four
Proportionals.

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to each other, as the powers themselves; which was to be demonstrated.

This proposition may otherwise be demonstrated.

For because D is the effect produced by the exertion of the power that the being A possesses*, the power that A possesses is the cause of the effect D; for the same reason E is an effect produced, of which the power that the being B possesses, is the cause, and both beings produced in the same time C; but effects produced, are in proportion to the causes that did produce them†; wherefore the effect D is to the effect E, as the power that A possesses is to the power that the being B possesses.

• Hyp.

† Ax. 2.
L. 1.

possesses. Therefore, two, or any number of beings, possessed with different powers, &c. which was to be demonstrated.

Corollary. From this proposition it follows, that if effects produced, be in proportion to the powers, which the beings producing them did possess, the times in which these effects were produced, are equal.

In the doctrine of proportion, I have demonstrated, that if there be three magnitudes taken in any order, the ratio which the first bears to the third, is compounded of the ratios of the first to the second, and the second to the third. And universally, if there be any number of magnitudes

K 2

taken

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taken in any order, the ratio that the first bears to the last, is compounded of all the preceding ratios. This property of the ratios of the magnitudes is cited by Euclid, in his demonstration of the twenty third proposition of his sixth book. Assumed by him from the tenth definition of his fifth book, and his definition of a ratio, compounded of ratios, which is his fifth definition of his sixth book, without a demonstration; and as this is one of the most useful properties of proportionals, and capable of a demonstration, it ought on that account not to be taken for granted. The demonstration that I have there given, is universal, and includes the properties of all beings in nature; which I shall state in the following lemma, in order to facilitate the demonstration.

monstration of the following proposition. I retain the definition of a ratio compounded of ratios; which Euclid gives in the fifth of his sixth Book.

L E M M A III.

IN comparing the powers of three beings, taken in any order, the power of the first is to the power of the third, in a ratio compounded of the first power to the second, and the second to the third.

Let A, B, and C be three beings, and let DE represent the power that A possesses, F the power that B possesses, and G the power that C possesses, and K the power

$$\begin{array}{ccccccc} A \odot & D & H & K & E \\ & \underline{\hspace{1cm}} & | & \underline{\hspace{1cm}} & | & \underline{\hspace{1cm}} \\ B \square & F & & & & \\ C \odot & G & & & & \end{array}$$

$$K \quad 3 \quad \text{power}$$

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power that C possesses: I say, that DE is to G in a ratio compounded of DE to F, and of F to G. For let DE, which is the power that A possesses, be thrice the power that B possesses, to wit F, and B's power be six times C's power, viz. G. Now because DE is thrice F, DE is divisible into three parts, each equal to F, which let be DH, HK, and KE; also because F is six times G, and

• Constr. DH is equal to F*, therefore DH will be six times G, for the same reason HK, KE, are each six times G; wherefore the whole DE contains G eighteen times, and consequently the Ratio of DE to G is eighteen †. But the ratio of DE to F is three, and the ratio of F to G is six ‡; therefore the ratio that is compounded of DE to F, and of F to G, is

† Def. of Ratios.

‡ Hyp.

Geometrically Demonstrated. 135

is eighteen*: But before it was de-
monstrated, that the ratio of DE to
G is eighteen, consequently the ratio
of DE to G is compounded of the
ratios of DE to F, and of F to G;
but DE, F, and G, represent the pow-
ers which the beings A, B, and C pos-
sess respectively. Therefore, the pow-
er that the being A possesses, is to
the power that B possesses, in a ratio
compounded of the ratios of A's
power to B's power, and of B's power
to C's power.

Again, let A, B, and C
be any three beings, and
let the power that A pos-
sesses be thrice the power
that B possesses; but the power that
B possesses be one sixth part of the
power that C possesses. Now because
A's power is thrice B's power, the

K 4

ratio

* Def. of
a Ratio
compounded
of Ra-
tios.

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ratio of A's power to B's power is three * ; and for the same reason the

* Def. of Ratios.

Ratio of B's power to C's power is one sixth, and consequently, the ratio that is equal to that, which is compounded of the ratios of A's power to B's power, and B's power

† Def. of the Ratio compounded of Ratios.
† Hyp.

to C's power †, is three sixths, or one third. But because A's power contains B's power thrice †, therefore A's power is divisible into three

parts, each of which is equal to B's power ; but B's power is one sixth of C's power, therefore each of these parts of A's power, equal to B's power, will be one sixth of C's power, and consequently A's power will be

§ Def. of Ratios.

three sixths of C's power ; therefore § the ratio of A's power to C's power, is three sixths, or one third : But it has been demonstrated, that the ratio
equal

equal to that, which is compounded of the ratios of A's power to B's power, and of B's power to C's power, is one third. Wherefore the power that A possesses, is to the power that C possesses, in a ratio compounded of A's power to B's power, and B's power to C's power.

Lastly, if there be four, or any number of beings, possessed with different powers, and taken in any order, the ratio of the first power to the last is compounded of the ratios of all the preceding powers.

For let A, B, C, D, be four beings, taken in any order, and possessed of different powers. I say, the ratio of the power in the being A, is to that in the being D, in a ratio compounded of

A. 

B. 

C. 

D. 

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the ratio of the power in A, to that in the being B, and of the power in B, to that in the being C, and of the power in C, to that in the being D. For, because there are three beings, A, B, and C, possessed with different powers, the power in the being A is to the power in the being C, in a ratio compounded of the ratio of the power in A, to the power in B, and of the ratio of the power in B, to that in C *. Again, because there are three beings, B, C, and D, possessed of different powers, the power in B will be to that in D, in a ratio compounded of the power in B to that in C, and of the power in C to that in D. But before it was proved, that the power in A to that in C, was compounded of the ratios of the power in A to that in B, and of

* Above
Demon-
stration.

of the power in B to that in C. Take that compound ratio, in the place of the ratio of the power in A to that in C, then will the ratio of the power in A to that in D, be compounded of the ratios of the power in A to that in B, of the power in B to that in C, and of the power in C to that in D.

After the same manner it may be demonstrated, that if there were five, six, or any number of beings, possessed of different powers, the ratio of the power of the first being, to that of the last, is compounded of the ratios of the powers of all the preceding beings.

Whatever property or proportion is demonstrated, of the powers that different beings possess, the same properties or proportions will also take place,

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place, with respect to the effects that are produced from the exertion of those powers. Because the exertion of those powers are the causes of the effects, and effects have the same proportion to one another as their causes have *. Wherefore; &c.

* Ax. 2.
L. 1.

PROPOSITION III.

THEOREM III.

Two, or any number of beings, possessed with different powers, the effects produced by the exertion of them in different times, will be in a ratio to one another compounded, of the power to the power that did produce them, and of the time to the time in which they were produced.

LET

A
 C  D
 — — —
 B
 E  F
 — — —
 G
 H
 — —

LET A and B be two beings, possessed with different powers, and let D be the effect that is produced from the exertion of the power possessed by A in the time C, and F the effect that is produced by the exertion of the power that B possesses in the time E. I say, the effect D is to the effect F, in a ratio compounded of the time C to the time E, and of the power that A possesses to the power that B possesses. For let G be a third being, possessed with a power equal to A's, and let H be the effect that is produced from the exertion of G's power in the time E. Then because the two beings A and G

are

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are possessed with equal powers, the effect D will be to the effect H, as the time C is to the time E*, in which they were produced. Again, because H and F are two effects produced, by the exertion of the powers that the beings G and B possess in the same time F; therefore the effect H is to the effect F, as the power that G possesses is to the power that B possesses†. And because there are three effects, D, H, and F, therefore the ratio of the first D to the third F, is compounded of the ratio of the first D to the second H, and of the second H to the third F‡. But it has been demonstrated, that D is to H, as the time C is to the time E, and as H is to F, so is the power in G, that is the power in A, to the power in B; therefore, the effect D is to the effect

* Prop. 1.
of this.

† Prop. 2.
of this.

‡ L. 3.

Geometrically Demonstrated. 143

fect F, in a ratio compounded of the time C to the time E, and of the power that A possesses to the power that the being B possesses. Therefore, two, or any number of beings, possessed with different powers, the effects produced by the exertion of them in different times, are to each other in a ratio compounded, of the power to the power, and of the time to the time, in which they were produced; which was to be demonstrated.

Corollary. From this proposition it follows, that if the powers that two or more beings possess, be represented by lines, which we shall suppose form one side of two or more rectangles, and the times in which these powers were exerted, be

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be also expressed by lines which form the adjacent sides of the same rectangles. Then because the superficies of rectangles are demonstrated by Euclid, in the twenty third proposition of his sixth book, to be to one another in a ratio compounded directly of the sides; and in this proposition the effects produced by the exertion of the powers in different beings, in different times, are proved to be to one another in a Ratio compounded directly of the powers and times in which they were produced; and these powers and times being here represented as the sides about the right angle in the rectangles, therefore the ratio that the effects bear to one another, will be the same, with the superficies of these rectangles,

angles, and the one may be expressed for the other; and therefore all the proportions that Euclid demonstrates, concerning the sides about the right angle and superficies of rectangles in his sixth book, will here take place with respect to the effects, to the powers that did produce them, and to the times in which they were produced. And therefore as he proves, in his fourteenth proposition of that book, that if the superficies of the rectangles are equal, the sides about the right angle are in reciprocal proportion; so here concerning powers of beings, the times of their operation, and the effects produced; if the effects produced are equal, then will the powers that did produce them, and

L the

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the times in which they were produced, be in reciprocal proportion. And if the powers of beings, and the times in which they operate, be in reciprocal proportion, the effects themselves will be equal. And therefore rectangles and their sides may be safely taken to express the effects, the power of beings, and the times of their operations; for since they have the same proportion to one another that these have, the one may be substituted for the other.

P R O-

PROPOSITION IV.

THEOREM IV.


Two beings possessed with different powers, and by the exertion of them producing different effects in different times. The power that the one being possesses is to the power the other possesses, in a ratio compounded, directly of the effects produced, and reciprocally of the times, in which these effects were produced.

LET A and B be two beings, possessed with different powers, and let D be the effect that is produced from the exertion of A's power in the time C, and F the effect that is produced from the exertion

L 2 of

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of B's power in the time E. I say, the power that A possesses, is to the power that B possesses, in a ratio compounded of the effect D to the



effect F; and of the time E to the time C. For let G be a third being, taken so, that D may be the effect produced from the exertion of the power it possesses in the time E. Then because the two beings A and G, produce the same effect D, in the times C and E; therefore*, the power that A possesses, is to the power that G possesses, as the time E is to the time C. Again, because the two beings G and B, produce the effects D and

* Cor.
Prop. 3.
of this:

Geometrically Demonstrated. 149

and F in the same time E; therefore*, ^{* Prop. 2. of this.} the effect D is to the effect F, as the power that G possesses is to the power that B possesses. Again, because there are three beings, A, G, and B, therefore † the power of A, is to the ^{† Lemma 3. preceding Prop. 3. of this.} power of B, in a ratio compounded of A's power to G's power, and of G's power to B's power; but before it was demonstrated, that A's power is to G's power, as the time E is to the time C; and also, that G's power is to B's power, as the effect D is to the effect F; wherefore A's power is to B's power, in a ratio compounded of the effect D to the effect F, and of the time E to the time C.

Therefore, *two beings possessed with different powers, and by the exertion of them producing different effects, in different times; the power that the*

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one being possesses, is to the power that the other possesses, in a ratio compounded directly of the effects produced, and reciprocally of the times in which they were produced; which was to be demonstrated.

Corollary. From this proposition it is evident, that if two different beings produce different effects in different times, the ratio of the time to the time, is compounded directly of the effects produced, and reciprocally of the powers that did produce them.


P R O-

PROPOSITION V.

PROBLEM I.

Two beings, possessed with powers of the same kind: One of which by the exertion of the power it possesses in a given time, produces a given effect; it is required to find the time, the other will take to produce an effect equal to the effect given.

LET A and B be two beings, possessed with powers of the same kind, and let A, by the exertion of its power in the time C, produce the effect D; it is



L 4

required

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required to find the time that B will produce an effect equal to D, by the exertion of the power it possesses. Let the power that A possesses be expressed by F, and the power that B possesses be expressed by G; and let E be a fourth proportional found to the three given Terms G, F, and C, then E will express the time required.

* Construction.

For because G is to F, as C is to E *, and G is the power that B possesses, F the power that A possesses, and C the time that A exerts its power to produce the effect D; therefore, as B's power is to A's power, so is the time that A exerts its power to the time E, consequently the powers and times are in reciprocal proportion; but when the powers of beings, and the times in which they exert them, are in reciprocal proportion, the effects

ffects produced by these beings are equal * ; wherefore E will be the ^{* Cor. Prop. 3. of this.} time the given being B will take in exerting the power it possesses, to produce an effect equal to the given effect D, which was to be done.

PROPOSITION VI.

THEOREM V.

Two unequal, but contrary causes or powers, pressing upon, or influencing one and the same being in the same time, that part of the effect that would have been produced by the exertion of the greater power alone, and which is destroyed by the conjunct exertion of both powers, is in proportion to the smaller power.

LET

LET A and $A \odot D \cdot G \cdot E$
B be two C
unequal, but —
contrary pow- $B \square F$
ers, whereof A —

is the greater, and C any portion of
time, and let DE be the effect that
would be produced by the exertion
of the power that A possesses, when
exerted alone in the time C, and F
the effect that would be produced in
the same time by the exertion of
B's power alone. Then because DE
and F are the effects that are produced
by the exertion of the unequal pow-
ers that A and B possess in the same
time C; therefore the effect DE is to
the effect F, as the power that A
possesses is to the power that B pos-
sesses*; but A's power is greater
than B's power†, therefore DE is
greater

* Prop. 2.
of this.

† Hyp.

greater than F*. Let DG be made <sup>*Prop. 14.
E. L. 5.</sup> equal to F, then will DG be the effect that would be produced, from the exertion of that part of the power that A possesses, equal to B's power in the same time C†, A's power being <sup>†Prop. 1.
of this.</sup> in this case still supposed to act alone. Therefore by the conjunct acting of the beings A and B in the same time C, the effects DG and F will be destroyed‡. Now since the effect <sup>‡Ax. 12.
Lib. 1.</sup> DG that is destroyed, is equal to F, and F is in proportion to the power that B possesses; consequently that part of the effect produced by the exertion of A's power, when acting alone, is in proportion to the power that B possesses. Therefore, *two unequal, but contrary causes or powers, pressing upon, or influencing the same being in the same time; that part of the*

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the effect that would have been produced by the exertion of the greater power alone, and which is destroyed by the conjunct acting of both powers, is in proportion to the smaller power; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION VII.

THEOREM VI.

Two unequal similar, but contrary powers or causes, pressing upon, or influencing one and the same being in the same time; the effect that would have been produced by the exertion of the greater power alone, is to that part of the effect that is destroyed by the conjunct exertion of both powers, as the greater power is to the smaller.

LET

LETA and **A** $\odot$ **D** **G** **E**
B betwo **C** |
 beings, posses- **B** $\square$ **F**
 sed with un-
 equal simlar,

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when both press or influence one and the same being in the same time *. But as A's power is to B's power, so is the effect DE produced from the exertion of the greatest power, viz. A's power alone, to DG, which is equal to DF. Therefore, *if two beings, possessed with unequal similar, but contrary powers, press upon, or influence one and the same being in the same time; the effect that would be produced by the exertion of the greater power when acting alone, is to that part of the effect that would be destroyed by the conjunct acting of both powers, as the greater power is to the smaller; which was to be demonstrated.*

* Prop. 6.
of this.

Cor. 1. From this and the preceding proposition it follows, that the effect

effect which is produced from the conjunct acting of two similar unequal, but contrary powers, is equal to the excess by which the greater exceeds the smaller, or equal to the effect which a similar power, equal to that excess, would produce when acting alone.

Coroll. 2. The effect that would be produced from the conjunct acting of two similar unequal, but contrary powers, pressing upon, or influencing the same being, will, upon the smaller power ceasing to act, be augmented in proportion to the smaller power.

PROPOSITION VIII.


THEOREM VII.

The effect that is produced from the conjunct acting of two unequal similar conspiring powers, pressing upon, or influencing the same being in the same time, is to the effect which would be produced from the acting of one of them alone, as the sum of the two powers is to that power which acts alone.

LET A and B be any two beings, possessed with unequal similar, and conspiring powers or qualities; and let C be any portion of time, and let DE be the effect that is produced from the exertion of A's power

Geometrically Demonstrated. 161

power in the
time C, and F
that which is
produced from
the exertion of
C's power in
the same time



C, when each act alone, and GH the effect that is produced from the common exertion of both the beings A and B, pressing upon or influencing one and the same being in the same time C: I say, the effect GH is to the effect DE, as the sum of both the powers is to A's power. For since the powers that A and B possess, are not only similar but conspiring *; therefore if the powers that *^{Hyp.} A and B possess were equal to one another, the same effect would be produced by them, pressing upon, or influencing

M

fluencing

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* Def. 7.
of this.

fluencing the same being, at different, but equal times of exertion *. And consequently when both these powers are exerted at the same time, so as to press upon, or influence the same being, the effect that is produced will be double the effect that is produced by the exertion of one of them alone. Again, if A's power be double of B's power, then may A's power be supposed divided into two parts, each equal to B's power, and in this case the same being will in the same time be pressed upon, or influenced by three equal similar and conspiring powers, the effect GH produced by the conjunct exertion of them, will be thrice the effect F, which is produced by one of them, *viz.* B's power alone; and DE, which is the effect of A's power, will

Geometrically Demonstrated. 163

will be double F, consequently the effect GH will be one third part greater than the effect DE, and the powers that A and B possess added together, will be a third part greater than the power that A possesses; after the same manner it may be demonstrated, that if the power that A possesses be thrice B's power, the effect GH, which is produced from the exertion of them in the same time, pressing upon, or influencing the same being, will be one fourth part greater than the effect DE, and the sum of the powers added together will also be one fourth part greater than the power that A possesses, and so on universally; therefore as the effect GH, is to the effect DE, so is the sum of the powers of the beings A and B, to the power

M 2 that

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* Def. of
four Pro-
portionals. that A possesses*. Therefore *the effect that is produced, from the conjunct acting of two unequal similar and conspiring powers, pressing upon, or influencing the same being in the same time, is to that which would be produced from one of them alone, as the sum of the powers is to that particular power; which was to be demonstrated.*

PROPOSITION IX.

THEOREM VIII.

Any one of the powers or qualities, which a dependent being possesses, may be diminished.

LET

LET A be any $A \odot$ C
 dependent being, B $\square$
 ing, and C any one

of the powers or qualities that A possesses: since C is one of the powers or qualities of a dependent being, it may be considered as a dependent being itself; and I say, C may be diminished. For because C is a dependent being *, its existence will be ^{* Hyp.} the effect of some other being †, ^{† Def. 27. L. 1.} and let that other being be B. Then because the existence of C is the effect of the being B †, C will be an ^{† Construction.} effect of which B is the cause; but effects are dependent upon the causes that did produce them ||, therefore the ^{|| Ax. 11. L. 1.} existence of C is dependent upon B. Then because the existence of C is dependent upon B, B will either be the cause that continues C in its existence,


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istence, or B can act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy its effect §. If B be the cause of continuing C in its existence, then will the existence of C be terminated by B's ceasing to exert the power by which C is continued in its existence *; wherefore in this case the power or quality of the being A, will not only be diminished, but totally destroyed.

§ Prop. 27.
L. 1.

* Prop. 18.
L. 1.

Again, let B not cease exerting the whole power by which any one power or quality of A is



continued in its existence. Let DC represent the power of B, by whose exertion the power or quality F of the being A is continued in its existence, and let B exert the part DE, of

Geometrically Demonstrated. 167

of the power DC; then because the effects produced by the exertion of unequal powers in the same time, are in proportion to these powers *, * Prop. 2. of this. therefore DC is to DE, as the effect F is to the effect that DE will produce; but DC is greater than DE†, † Construction. therefore the effect F is greater than the effect that will be produced by DE; consequently by the exertion of DE, only the effect F, which is one of the powers or qualities that the being A possesses, will be diminished. Lastly, if the exertion of the power DC does not continue the power or quality F of the being A in its existence, but can act in opposition to that cause, so as to destroy the whole, or part of the effect; then by B's exerting of that power, the existence of the whole

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power or quality F, or the existence of part of it in proportion to the power DC, which the being B possesses, will be destroyed*; consequently in this respect the power F, or quality of the being A, will be diminished. Therefore, *any one of the powers or qualities of a dependent being may be diminished*; which was to be demonstrated.

* Prop. 19.
L. 1. and
Prop. 6.
of this.


PROPOSITION X.

THEOREM IX.

None of the powers or qualities, that a self-existing and independent being possesses, can be diminished.

LET

LET A represent a self-existing and independent being, BC one of the powers or qualities it possesses: I say, that BC cannot be diminished. For if it be possible for BC to be diminished, let that part by which it is diminished be DC; then because DC is terminated in its existence*, and DC may be considered by itself as one



being. But that being whose existence may terminate, is a dependent being†; therefore DC is a dependent being, and its existence is dependent on some other being‡, let that being if possible be E, but DC is one of the powers or qualities of a self-existing and independent being§; §Hyp. wherefore its existence is independent

†Prop. 42.
L. 1.
‡Prop. 16.
Lib. 1.

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¶ Def. 26.
 Lib. 1.

 dent on any other being whatsoever, and consequently independent of E; therefore the existence of DC is both dependent and independent of E*, which is absurd; from that absurdity it follows, that BC cannot be diminished, consequently no power or quality that the being A possesses, can be diminished. Therefore, *none of the powers or qualities that a self-existing and independent being possesses, can be diminished*; which was to be demonstrated.

• Ax.
 Lib. 1.

PROPOSITION XI.

THEOREM X.

That being, any one of whose powers or qualities may be diminished, is a dependent being.

LET

LET A be any being, A $\odot$
 and BC any one of B C
 the powers or qualities it
 possesses, and let it be pos-
 sible for BC to be diminished: I
 say, A is a dependent being. For if
 A is not a dependent being, its exi-
 stence will be independent of any
 other being whatsoever, and conse-
 quently A is a self-existing and in-
 dependent being*. Now since A is <sup>* Def. 26.
Lib. 1.</sup>
 a self-existing and independent being,
 and BC is one of the powers or qua-
 lities it possesses, BC cannot be di-
 minished † contrary to the hypo- <sup>† Prop. 3.
of this.</sup>
 thesis; therefore A is not a self-
 existing and independent being, and
 consequently A is a dependent being.
 Therefore, *that being, any one of
 whose powers or qualities can be di-
 minished, is a dependent being; which
 was to be demonstrated.*

P R O-

PROPOSITION XII.

THEOREM XI.

That being, none of whose powers or qualities can be diminished, is a self-existing and independent being.

LET A be such a being, none of whose powers or qualities can be diminished: I say, that A is a self-existing and independent being. For let BC be one of its powers or qualities; now if A is not a self-existing and independent being, its existence will be dependent on some other being *; therefore A is a dependent being †, and consequently BC is one of the powers or qualities of

* Prop. 16.
L. 1.

† Def. 27.
L. 1.

Geometrically Demonstrated. 173

of a dependent being, but any one of the powers or qualities of a dependent being may be diminished * ; * Prop. 9. of this. therefore BC can be diminished, but BC cannot be diminished † ; where- † Hyp. fore BC both can and cannot be diminished, which is absurd ; from that absurdity it follows, that the existence of A is independent of any other being. But a being, whose existence is independent of any other being, is a self existing and independent being ‡, consequently the being ‡ Def. 26. L. 1. A is a self-existing and independent being.

Therefore, *that being, none of whose powers or qualities can be diminished, is a self-existing and independent being ;* which was to be demonstrated.


P R O-

PROPOSITION XIII.

THEOREM XII.

The powers or qualities, which a self-existing and independent being possesses, cannot be augmented.

LET A represent a self-existing being, and BC one of its powers or qualities: I say,



BC cannot be augmented. For if it be possible for BC to be augmented, let CD represent that part which is so augmented. Then because CD is a being produced, and antecedent to its existence a time may be assigned *; therefore CD is a temporary being †, and consequently its existence

* Hyp.

† Def. 21.
L 1.

Geometrically Demonstrated. 175

stence depends on some other being *, * Prop. 4.
but CD is a power or quality of a self-existing and independent being†, † Hyp.
and therefore its existence is independent of any other being whatsoever; wherefore the existence of CD is both dependent and independent on some other being §, which § Ax. 9.
is absurd. Wherefore the existence of CD cannot have had a beginning, consequently the power CD of the self-existing and independent being A, cannot be augmented. L. 1.

Therefore, the powers or qualities that a self-existing and independent being possesses, cannot be augmented; which was to be demonstrated.

P R O-

PROPOSITION XIV.

THEOREM XIII.

That being, any one of whose powers or qualities can be augmented, is a dependent being.

LET A be any being, and C one of the powers or qualities that A possesses, and let the power CD be capable of being augmented: I say, that the being A is a dependent being. For the existence of A is either dependent or inde-

pendent of some other being*; if the existence of A be independent of any other being, then will A be a self-existing and independent be-

ing†, and CD will be one of the powers

* Ax. 10.
L. 1.

† Def. 26.
L. 1.

powers or qualities of a self-existing and independent being; but none of the powers or qualities of a self-existing and independent being can be augmented*, wherefore D cannot^{*Prop. 13. of this.} be augmented, but C D can be augmented†; therefore it can and cannot†^{Hyp.} be augmented, which is absurd.

From this absurdity it follows, that the existence of A is not independent of any other being, consequently ‡ A ‡^{Def. 26. Lib. 1.} is not a self-existing being; but the existence of every being, which is not self-existing, is dependent upon some other being §; therefore the existence §^{Prop. 16. L. 1.} of A is dependent on some other being, which let be B □

B. Then because the existence of A is dependent on the being B ||, and effects are dependent upon ||^{Hyp.} the causes that did produce them*, *^{Ax. 11. L. 1.} therefore the existence of A is an effect

N of

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of which the being B is the cause. But that being, whose existence is the effect of some other being, is a dependent being *, wherefore A is a dependent being. Therefore, *that being, any one of whose powers or qualities can be augmented, is a dependent being; which was to be demonstrated,*

* Def. 27.
L. 1.


PROPOSITION XV.

THEOREM XIV.

No change or mutation can be made on any one of the powers or qualities, which a self-existing being possesses; or all the powers or qualities which a self-existing being possesses, from eternity to eternity, were, and will be the same unaltered, or unchanged.

LET A represent a self-existing and independent being, CD one of the powers or qualities it possesses:

ses: I say, that no change or mutation can be made on CD. For if it be possible for any change or mutation to be made on CD, that change or mutation must either be an augmentation, or diminution of CD; therefore the power or quality CD may be either augmented or diminished: but CD is one of the powers or qualities that the being A possesses*, and any being* ^{Hyp.} that may have any of its powers or qualities augmented or diminished, is a dependent being†; wherefore ^{† Prop. 11. and 14. of this.} the being A is a dependent being, and its existence is the effect of some other being ‡, but A is a self-existing ^{‡ Def. 27. L. 1.} and independent being §, and its existence ^{§ Hyp.} can be the effect of no other being ||, which is absurd. Therefore, ^{[Def. 26. L. 1.} no change or mutation can be made



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on any of the powers or qualities that the being A possesses; and consequently from eternity to eternity they will be the same unchanged or altered. Therefore, *no change or mutation can be made on any of the powers or qualities which a self-existing and independent being possesses; or the powers or qualities which a self-existing and independent being possesses from eternity to eternity, were, and will be the same; which was to be demonstrated.*

PROPOSITION XVI.

THEOREM XV.

Those powers or qualities of any being, which bath certain limits or boundaries, may either be augmented, or diminished.

LET A be any being, BC one of its powers or qualities, and let

Geometrically Demonstrated. 181

let BC have certain limits or boundaries : I say, BC may either be augmented or diminished ;
 for because B C has A $\odot$
 certain limits or bound- B C
 daries*, therefore BC ————— * Hyp.
 is a finite being †, and † Def. 5.
 consequently however great BC is, L. 1.
 it may be doubled, tripled, or any
 multiple whatsoever of it may be
 taken; therefore BC may be aug-
 mented, but BC is one of the pow-
 ers that the being A possesses ‡. But ‡ Hyp.
 that being, any of whose powers or
 qualities may be augmented, is a de-
 pendent being §, therefore A is a de- § Prop. 14.
 pendent being : Now because A is a of this.
 dependent being, and any one of the
 powers or qualities of a dependent
 being may be diminished ||, therefore || Prop. 11.
 BC, which is one of the powers or of this.
 qualities of A, may be diminished.

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Therefore, *those powers or qualities of any being that bath certain limits or boundaries; may be either augmented or diminished;* which was to be demonstrated.

Cor. From this proposition it follows, that any being, whose powers or qualities have limits or boundaries, is a dependent being.


PROPOSITION XVII.

THEOREM XVI.

The powers or qualities that a self-existing being possesses, are without limits or boundaries, or they are infinite.

LET A represent a self-existing and independent being; and BC any one of the powers or qualities that A possesses: I say, BC is without limits or boundaries, or it is infinite.

infinite. For if it be possible for BC to have certain limits or boundaries, then because any being that has certain



limits or boundaries, may be augmented or diminished *; wherefore BC may be augmented or diminished,

*Prop. 16. of this.

but BC is one of the powers that the being A possesses †. And any being, † Hyp.

whose powers may be augmented or diminished, is a dependent being †,

†Prop. 11 and 14. of this.

therefore A is a dependent being,

and its existence is the effect of some

other being §; but its existence is

§Def. 27. Lib. 1.

independent of any other being what-

soever ||, and is the effect of no other

||Def. 26. Lib. 1.

being, because it is a self-existing

and independent being, which is ab-

surd. From that absurdity it follows,

that BC has no limits or bounda-

ries; but any being that has no limits

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* Def. 8. or boundaries, is infinite*; therefore
Lib. 1. BC is infinite.

Therefore, *the powers or qualities that a self-existing and independent being possesses, are without limits or boundaries, or they are infinite; which was to be demonstrated.*

PROPOSITION XVIII.

THEOREM XVII.

That being, whose powers or qualities are finite, is a dependent being.

LET A be any being, and BC one of its powers or qualities, and let BC be finite; then because BC is a finite being, it has limits or boundaries†. But a being, whose powers or qualities have limits or boundaries, is a dependent

A ⊙
B C

† Def. 5.
Lib. 1.

pendent being*, and BC is one of ^{* Cor. Prop. 16. of this.} the powers or qualities of the being

A†, therefore A is a dependent being. †Hyp.

Therefore, *any being, whose powers or qualities are finite, is a dependent being*; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XIX.

THEOREM XVIII.

The exertion of the powers or qualities which a self-existing and independent being possesses, may press upon, or influence any other being whatsoever, that ever did or can exist.

LET A represent a self- A 
existing and indepen- B 
dent being, and B any
other being whatsoever: I say, that
the exertion of the powers or quali-
ties that A possesses, may press upon,
or influence the being B. For if it
be

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be possible for the powers or qualities of A not to be able to press upon or influence the being B, then will the powers or qualities that A possesses have certain limits or boundaries, and consequently are finite *. But that being whose powers or qualities are finite, is a dependent being †, consequently A is a dependent being. Again, because A is a dependent being, its existence will be the effect of some other being ‡; but A. is a self-existing and independent being §, and its existence is independent of any other being whatsoever ||, and consequently its existence can be the effect of no other being, which is absurd. From this Absurdity it follows, that the powers or qualities that A possesses, may press upon, or influence the being B. Therefore, *the exertion of the powers or qualities, which*

* Def. 5.
L. 1.

† Prop. 18.
of this.

‡ Def. 27.
Lib. 1.

§ Hyp.

|| Def. 26.
Lib. 1.

which a self-existing and independent being possesses, may press upon, or influence any other being whatsoever, that ever did or can exist; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XX.

THEOREM XIX.

If the exertion of the powers or qualities of any being, press upon, or influence any other being; some of the powers or qualities of that being so pressed upon, or influenced by the other being, will suffer some change or mutation upon the receiving that pressure or influence.

LET A and B be two beings,
and let the exertion of the
powers or qualities that A possesses,
press upon, or influence the being B:
I say,

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I say, some of the powers
or qualities that B pos- A 
sesses, will suffer some B 
change or mutation upon

B's receiving that pressure or influ-
ence. For because B is actuated by

a pressure or influence that arises
from the exertion of the powers or

• Hyp.

qualities of A * ; therefore that pres-
sure or influence with which B is

actuated, is an effect of which the
exertion of the power or qualities of

† Def. 23.
L. 1.

A is the cause †, which effect will
either conspire with, or be contrary
to some of the powers or qualities of
B, or neither of them. If it be con-

spiring with, or contrary to any of
the powers or qualities of B, then
will some of the powers or qualities
that B possesses, be increased or di-
minished, by that new received

I

power,

power*, and consequently the powers or qualities that B possesses, will * Def. 6 and 8. of this.

suffer a change or mutation upon its receiving that pressure or influence.

But if that effect be neither conspiring with, nor contrary to any of the powers or qualities that B possesses, that pressure or influence with which B is actuated, cannot affect any of its powers or qualities, and consequently cannot affect the being B†; and the † Hyp.

being B is pressed upon or influenced by that exertion, and therefore is affected by it, which is absurd. Therefore, *if the exertion of the power or qualities of any being, press upon, or influence any other being, some of the powers or qualities of that other being, so pressed upon by the other being, will suffer some change or mutation, upon its receiving that pressure or influence;*

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influence; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XXI.

THEOREM XX.

The exertion of the powers or qualities of any being, that ever did or can exist, cannot press upon, nor influence a self-existing and independent being.

LET A represent a self-existing and independent being, and B any being whatsoever: I say, the exertion of the powers or qualities that B possesses, cannot press upon, or influence the self-existing being A; for if it be possible for the exertion of the powers or qualities that B pos-

Geometrically Demonstrated. 191

B possesses, to press upon, or influence the self-existing being A; then will the exertion of the powers or qualities of B act upon A, and consequently some effect will be produced by them in A, which effect will cause a change or mutation of some of the powers or qualities of A *; but A is a self-existing and independent being †, and therefore no change or mutation can be made in any of the powers or qualities which A possesses †, which is absurd. From this absurdity it follows, that the exertion of the powers or qualities that B possesses, cannot press upon, or influence the self-existing and independent being A. Therefore, *the exertion of the powers or qualities that any being whatsoever possesses, that ever did or can exist, cannot press upon, or influence a self-existing*

* Prop. 20.
of this.

† Hyp.

† Prop. 15.
of this.

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existing and independent being; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XXII.

THEOREM XXI.

Every dependent being, may be pressed upon or influenced by the exertion of the powers or qualities of some other being.

LET A be a dependent being: I say, A ○
that A may be pressed upon or influenced by the exertion of the powers or qualities of some other being. For because the exertion of the powers or qualities that a self-existing and independent being possesses, can press upon, or influence any being whatsoever, that ever did or can exist;

exist *; therefore the exertion of the powers or qualities that a self-existing and independent being possesses, may press upon, or influence the dependent being A. Therefore, *every dependent being may be pressed upon, or influenced, by the exertion of the powers or qualities that a self-existing and independent being possesses; which was to be demonstrated.*

* Prop. 19.
of this.

PROPOSITION XXIII.

THEOREM XXII.

That being, on any of whose powers or qualities a change or mutation can be made, is a dependent being.

LET A be a being, upon any of whose powers or qualities some change or mutation can be made: I

O

say,

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say, A is a dependent being ; for let CD be one of the powers or qualities of A, on which



some change or mutation can be made. Now because the change or mutation that is made on CD, will either augment or diminish it ; therefore A is such a being, whose powers or qualities may be either augmented or diminished : but a being, whose powers or qualities may be either augmented or diminished, is

* Prop. 11
and 14. of
this.

a dependent being*, wherefore A is a dependent being.

Therefore, *that being, on any of whose powers or qualities a change or mutation can be made, is a dependent being ; which was to be demonstrated.*

P R O-

PROPOSITION XXIV.

THEOREM XXIII.

That being, which may be pressed upon, or influenced, by the exertion of the powers or qualities of any other being, is a dependent being.

LET A and B be two beings, and let the being A be pressed upon, or influenced, by the exertion of the powers or qualities of B: I say, A is a dependent being. For because the being A is pressed upon, or influenced, by the exertion of the powers or qualities of B^{*}; therefore^{*HYP.} some change or mutation will be made on the powers or qualities of

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A, by that pressure or influence with which it is actuated from the exertion of the powers or qualities of B † ; but a being, on whose powers or qualities some change or mutation can be made, is a dependent being †, wherefore A is a dependent being.

† Prop. 20.
of this.

† Prop. 23.
of this.

Therefore, that being which may be pressed upon, or influenced, by the exertion of the powers or qualities of any other being, is a dependent being; which was to be demonstrated.

This proposition may be otherwise demonstrated, as follows.

For if the existence of A is not dependent on any other being whatsoever, then is A a self-existing and independent being * ; but the powers or qualities of a self-existing and independent being, cannot be pressed

* Def. 26.
Lib. I.

fed upon, or influenced, by the exertion of the powers or qualities of any other being whatsoever, that ever did or can exist †; therefore A cannot be pressed upon, or influenced, by the exertion of the powers or qualities of the being B, contrary to the hypothesis, which is absurd. From this absurdity it follows, that the existence of A is dependent on some other being, and consequently the existence of A is an effect of which that other being upon which its existence depends is the cause; but a being, whose existence is the effect of some other being, is a dependent being*, wherefore A is a dependent being. Therefore, *that being, which can be pressed upon, or influenced, &c.* which was to be demonstrated.

†Prop. 21.
of this.

*Def. 27.
L. 1.

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PROPOSITION XXV.

THEOREM XXIV.

Two, or any multitude of self-existing and independent beings, never did, nor can exist.

FOR because a self- A $\odot$
 existing and inde- B $\square$
 pendent being, from eter-

• Prop. 41 nity did, and to eternity will exist *;
 and 45. therefore, if two or any multitude of
 Lib. 1. self-existing beings do exist, they al-
 ways did and will exist. Let there-
 fore, if possible, two such beings exist,
 which let be represented by A and
 B; then because A is a self-existing
 and independent being, the exertion
 of the powers or qualities that A pos-
 sesses, can press upon, or influence,
 any

any other being whatsoever, that ever did or can exist * ; therefore the exertion of the powers or qualities that A possesses, can press upon, or influence, the being B. But any being that can be pressed upon, or influenced, by the exertion of the powers or qualities of another being, is a dependent being † ; therefore B is a dependent being, and its existence is the effect of some other being ‡. But B is a self-existing and independent being §, and its existence is independent of any other being whatsoever, that ever did or can exist ¶, which is absurd ; wherefore both A and B cannot be self-existing and independent beings. After the same manner it may be demonstrated, that any multitude of self-existing and independent beings cannot exist.

*Prop. 19.
of this.

†Prop. 24.
of this.

‡Def. 27.
Lib. 1.

§Hyp.

¶Def. 26.
L. 1.

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Therefore, *two, or any multitude of self-existing and independent beings, never did, nor can exist*; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XXVI.

THEOREM XXV.

One, and only one self-existing and independent being, ever did, or can exist, and the powers or qualities of that being are infinite, invariable, and unchangeable.

•Prop. 6.
L. 1.

FOR because some being from all eternity existed *; and a being which from all eternity existed, is a self-existing and independent being †; also a self-existing and independent being to all eternity will exist ‡. Therefore, one self-existing and

†Prop. 39.
L. 1.

‡Prop. 45.
Lib. 1.

and independent being; from all eternity has, and to all eternity will exist. Again, because the powers or qualities of a self-existing being are infinite*, invariable, or incapable of any mutation; therefore one self-existing and independent being, possessed with powers or qualities, unvariable or incapable of any mutation, from all eternity did, and to all eternity will exist. Neither is it possible for any more such beings to be than one; for if there could, then would it be possible for two or more self-existing and independent beings to exist, which is absurd†. From this absurdity it follows, *that one, and only one self-existing and independent being, from all eternity did, does, and to all eternity will exist, and the powers or qualities of that being are infinite,*

* Prop. 15.
of this,
and Prop.
17. of this.

† Prop. 25.
of this.

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infinite, invariable, and unchangeable;
which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XXVII.

THEOREM XXVI.

A being, which can exist without acting, is possessed with properties or qualities, different from active powers.

LET A be any being that can exist without acting: I say, that A is possessed with other properties than active powers. For let BC be any portion of time, and D the point of duration that terminates the last action of A; and DC, that part of time that immediately flows after the last action of A is terminated.



nated. Now because A is a being that does exist in the time DC*, it* Hyp. will have some properties; for if it has none, then will A be nothing †, † Ax. 1. L. 1. and consequently A is no existing being, contrary to the Hypothesis, which is absurd. Therefore the being A, in the time DC, has some properties, but these cannot be active properties, because the last action that it was capable of exerting, was terminated in the point of duration D‡; wherefore the being A is pos- † Hyp. and Construction. sessed with properties, which are not active powers.

Therefore, *a being that can exist without acting, is possessed with properties or qualities, different from active powers; which was to be demonstrated.*

PROPOSITION XXVIII.

THEOREM XXVII.

A being that is possessed with no power or quality different from an active power, cannot exist without acting.

LET A be any being that is possessed of no power or quality different from an active power : I say, that the being A cannot exist without acting. For if it be possible for A to exist without acting, let BC represent any portion of time, and D the point of duration that terminates the last act that A exerted, and DC that part of time that immediately flows after the point of duration D. Now since the being

A

A continues to exist in the part of duration DC *, it will exist without ^{*Hyp.} acting; but any being that does or can exist without acting, is possessed of some other powers or qualities different from active powers †; therefore the being A is possessed of some ^{†Prop. 27. of this.} other powers or qualities different from active powers, contrary to the hypothesis, which is absurd; consequently the being A cannot exist after the point of duration D, and its existence will terminate in the same point of duration, in which the last action that it is capable of exerting is terminated; wherefore the being A cannot exist without acting. Therefore, *a being that is possessed with no powers or qualities different from active powers, cannot exist without acting*; which was to be demonstrated.

P R O-


PROPOSITION XXIX.

THEOREM XXVIII.

The cause of the exertion of the power of any being, which is the cause of an effect, is either a self-determining power or volition in the being itself: or the immediate pressure or influence of some other being, upon that being which exerts that power.

LET A be any being, BC one of the powers that A possesses, and let the effect D be produced from the exertion of the power BC: I say, the cause of the exertion of the power BC, is either a self-determining power, or volition in A, or it is the immediate pressure or influence of

of some other being upon
the being A. For be-
cause the exertion of the
power BC, in order to
produce the effect D, is
itself an effect, and con-
sequently is owing to



some Cause *; that cause will ei-
ther be the being A itself, some other
being, or no being. First it cannot
arise from no being, otherwise there
would be an effect produced, to wit,
the exertion of the power BC, that
does produce the effect D without a
cause, which is absurd †; therefore
the exertion of the power BC, is ei-
ther owing to some other being, or
to A itself: if it be owing to some
other being, let that being be E. Now
because the exertion of the power
BC, is owing to the being E ‡, there-
fore

* Ax. 2.
L. 1.

† Ax. 2.
L. 1.

‡ Hyp.

fore the being A could not exert the power BC, independent of E; and consequently A will be pressed upon or influenced by the being E, to cause it to exert the power BC, for the production of the effect D.

Lastly, if the exertion of the power BC be owing to no other being but A itself, then will the cause of the exertion of the power BC, be the determination of the being A, independent of any other being, or without the immediate pressure or influence of any other being, and consequently the cause of the exertion of the power BC, for producing the effect D, will be an act of the being A of its own will, by which it determines itself to exert that power, without the immediate pressure or influence of any other being; but

I

that

that power by which any being acts of its own will, without the immediate pressure or influence of any other being, is a self-determining power or volition in the acting being*; * Def. 1. of this. wherefore the cause of the exertion of the power BC, is in this case the self-determining power or volition of the being A. Therefore, *the cause of the exertion of the power of any being, which is the cause of an effect, is either a self-determining power or volition in the being itself: or the immediate pressure or influence of some other being on that being which exerts that power; which was to be demonstrated.*

Corollary. From this proposition it follows, that if the cause of the exertion of a power in any being,

P be

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be not the immediate pressure or influence of some other being, it will be the self-determining power or volition in the being exerting that power. And if the cause of the exertion of the power be not a self-determining power in the being itself, it will be the immediate pressure or influence of some other being on the being that exerts the power.

P R O-

PROPOSITION XXX.

THEOREM XXIX.

If a self-existing and independent being exerts any power or quality, and consequently from that exertion an effect is produced, the cause of that exertion will be a self-determining power, or volition, that the self-existing and independent being does possess.

LET A represent a self- A $\odot$
 existent and indepen- D $\square$
 dent being, and let D be
 the effect that is produced from the
 exertion of one of the powers or qua-
 lities of A : I say, the cause of the
 exertion of the power or quality of
 A, that does produce the effect D, is
 P 2 a self-

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a self-determining power or volition in the being A. For if the cause of the exertion of the power or quality of A, that does produce the effect D, be not a self-determining power or volition of A, it will be the pressure or influence of some other being * ; which pressure or influence will be the exertion of a power or quality that some other being possesses †, consequently the self-existing and independent being A, may be pressed upon, or influenced, by the exertion of the powers or qualities of some other being, which is absurd ‡. From this absurdity it follows; that the cause of the exertion of the power or quality of the self-existing and independent being A, that produces the effect D, is a self-determining power or volition that A possesses. Therefore,

• Cor.
Prop. 29.
of this.

† Def. 22.
L. 1.

‡ Prop. 21.
of this.

fore, if a self-existing and independent being exert any power or quality, and consequently from that exertion an effect is produced, the cause of that exertion will be a self-determining power, or volition, that the self-existing and independent being does possess; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XXXI.

THEOREM · XXX.

The existence of the first temporary being, is the effect that arises from the exertion of some of the powers or qualities of the self-existing and independent being.

LET A represent the first temporary being: I say, that the
P 3 existence

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existence of A, is the effect that arises from the exertion of the powers or qualities of the self-existing and independent being. For because A is a tempo-

• Hypoth. rary being*, its existence is dependent on some other antecedent existing be-

+ Prop. 4. ing †; but no being exists antecedent
Lib. 1. to A, but the self-existing and inde-

† Hyp. pendent being ‡; therefore the exi-
and 41. stence of A is dependent on the self-
Prop. L. 1. existing and independent being. A-

gain, because the existence of A is an effect produced, this effect will have a cause §, and the existence of the cause of any effect, is antecedent

¶ Prop. 2. to the existence of that effect ||;
L. 1. wherefore the existence of the cause of A's existence, is antecedent to A's existence: but the self-existing and independent being, is the only being that

that exists antecedent to A *; there-^{* Hyp.} fore the self-existing and independent being, is the cause of the existence of the first temporary being A. But that being, which is the cause of the existence of any effect, exerts some power or quality it possesses, for the production of that effect†; where-^{† Def. 23. and 25. L. 1.} fore the existence of the first tempo-
rary being A, is the effect that arises from the exertion of some of the powers or qualities that the self-existing and independent being possesses.

Therefore, *the existence of the first temporary being, is the effect that arises from the exertion of some of the powers or qualities of a self-existing and independent being; which was to be demonstrated.*

PROPOSITION XXXII.

THEOREM XXXI

The self-existing and independent being does possess a self-determining power, or volition, and that self-determining power, or volition, is the cause of the existence of the first temporary being.

LET A represent the self-existing and independent being, B the first temporary being: I say, the self-existing and independent being A, is possessed of a self-determining power or volition, and that self-determining power or volition, is the cause of the existence of the first temporary being B. For because the existence

existence of the first temporary being B, is the effect that arises from the exertion of some of the powers or qualities of the self-existing and independent being A *, and the cause ^{*Prop. 31. of this.} of the exertion of any power or quality of the self-existing and independent being, is a self-determining power, that the self-existing and independent being does possess †; there- ^{†Prop. 30. of this.} fore the cause of the exertion of that power or quality of the self-existing and independent being A, which does produce the existence of B, is a self-determining power or volition that A does possess, and will be the cause of B's existence; consequently the self-existing and independent being A, does possess a self-determining power, or volition, which self-determining power, or volition,

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volition, is the cause of the existence of the first temporary being B's existence. Therefore, *the self-existing and independent being, does possess a self-determining power, which self-determining power is the cause of the existence of the first temporary being; which was to be demonstrated.*


PROPOSITION XXXIII.

THEOREM XXXII.

No time can be assigned, when the self-determining power or volition of the self-existing and independent being, ever did, or can cease from acting.

LET A represent the self-existing and independent being: I say,
no

no time can be assigned, when the self-determining power or volition of A, ever did, or can cease from acting; for because the self-determining power or volition of a being, is a power by which it determines or orders its actions, without the pressure or influence of any other being*; and that ordering is the exertion of the self-determining power or volition of the being A, therefore that determination, or ordering, is † itself an action of the being A, and consequently the self-determining power or volition of A, is a power that consists of acting alone; and therefore the self-determining power of A, may itself be considered as a being, and consequently



* Def. 1. of this.

† Def. 23. L. 1.

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quently does possess no power or quality different from an active power. But a being, that does possess no power different from an active

†Prop. 27. power, cannot exist without acting*;
of this.

therefore, the self-determining power, or volition, of the self-existing and independent being A, cannot exist without acting. And if it were possible for the self-determining power or volition of A, at any time to cease from acting, then would the existence of that power terminate in the same point of duration in which

†Ax. 2. it ceases from acting†, and conse-
of this.

quently a power or quality of the self-existing and independent being A, would not only be diminished, but would terminate in its existence,

†Prop. 10. which is absurd ‡; wherefore no
of this,
and Prop. time can be assigned when the self-
45. Lib. 1. deter-

determining power or volition of the self-existing and independent being A, ever did, or can cease from acting. Therefore, *no time can be assigned, when the self-determining power or volition of the self-existing and independent being, ever did, or ever can cease from acting; which was to be demonstrated.*

Corollary. From this and the two preceding propositions it follows, that the self-existing and independent being, is possessed with the powers of acting, thinking, willing, and determining.

PROPOSITION XXXIV.

THEOREM XXXIII.

The self-determining power, or volition, of the self-existing and independent being, from all eternity did, and to all eternity will continue to act.

FOR because no time can be assigned, when the self-determining power, or volition, of the self-existing and independent being, did or can cease from acting *; therefore the self determining power, or volition, of the self-existing and independent being, from eternity did, and to eternity will continue to act. For if the self-determining power, or volition, of the self-existing

ing

* Prop. 33.
of this.

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ing and independent being, did not act from all eternity, and will not continue to act to all eternity, then may a time be assigned when the self-determining power, or volition, of the self-existing and independent being, does not, or will not act, which is absurd *. Therefore, *the* ^{* Prop. 33. of this.} self-determining power, or volition, of the self-existing and independent being, from all eternity has acted, and to all eternity will continue to act; which was to be demonstrated.

P R O-

PROPOSITION XXXII.

THEOREM XXXI

The self-existing and independent being does possess a self-determining power, or volition, and that self-determining power, or volition, is the cause of the existence of the first temporary being.

LET A represent the self-existing and independent being, B the first temporary being: I say, the self-existing and independent being A, is possessed of a self-determining power or volition, and that self-determining power or volition, is the cause of the existence of the first temporary being B. For because the existence

existence of the first temporary being B, is the effect that arises from the exertion of some of the powers or qualities of the self-existing and independent being A *, and the cause ^{*Prop. 31. of this.} of the exertion of any power or quality of the self-existing and independent being, is a self-determining power, that the self-existing and independent being does possess†; there- ^{†Prop. 30. of this.} fore the cause of the exertion of that power or quality of the self-existing and independent being A, which does produce the existence of B, is a self-determining power or volition that A does possess, and will be the cause of B's existence; consequently the self-existing and independent being A, does possess a self-determining power, or volition, which self-determining power, or volition,

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PROPOSITION XXXVI.

THEOREM XXXV.

A time may be assigned, when any dependent being did not, or may not act.

LET A be any de- A 
pendent being: I
say, a time may be assigned, when
A did not, or may not act. For if it
be not possible to assign a time, when
A did not, or cannot act; then because
no time can be assigned, when the
being A did not, or could not act,
that being is the self-existing and
independent being *; therefore A is
the self-existing and independent be-
ing, and consequently A's existence
is independent of any other being
whatsoever †; but A is a dependent
being ‡, and its existence is the ef-
fect

*Prop. 35.
of this.

† Def. 26.
Lib. 1.

‡ Hyp.

fect of some other being †, and consequently the existence of A is dependent upon that other being whose effect the existence of A is, which is absurd. From that absurdity it follows, that a time may be assigned, when the dependent being A did not, or may not act. Therefore, *a time may be assigned, when any dependent being did not, or may not act*; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XXXVII.
THEOREM XXXVI.

No time can be assigned, when the self-existing and independent being did not, or cannot act.

LET A represent the self-existing and independent being: I say, no time can be assigned, when A did

Q 2 not,

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not, or cannot act. For
because the acting of a A 
being, is the exertion of
any of the powers it possesses, and
by which it presses upon, or influ-
ences itself, or any other being * ;
but A is the self-existing and indepen-
dent being, and therefore is possessed
of a self-determining power, or vo-
lition † ; therefore the exertion of
the self-determining power, or vo-
lition, that is, the acting of the self-
determining power, or volition, will
be the acting of the self-existing and
independent being A. But no time
can be assigned, when the self-deter-
mining power, or volition, of the
self-existing and independent being
ceases from acting ‡ ; therefore, no
time can be assigned, when the self-
existing and independent being A,
does

* Def. 23.
Lib. 1.

Prop. 32.
of this.

† Prop. 33.
of this.

does not, or cannot act. Therefore, *no time can be assigned, when the self-existing and independent being does not, or cannot act*; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XXXVIII.

THEOREM XXXVII.

If a time can be assigned, when any given being did not, or cannot act, that is a dependent being.

LET A be any being, A ○
and let it be possible
to assign a time, when A did not, or
could not act: I say, A is a depen-
dent being. For if A is not a de-
pendent being, the existence of A
will be independent of any other be-
ing whatsoever, and consequently
A is a self-existing and independent
being;
Q 3

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• Def. 26. being *; but no time can be assigned,
L. 1. when the self-existing and independent

† Prop 37. being did not, or cannot act †,
of this. wherefore no time can be assigned,
when the being A did not, or cannot

‡ Hyp. act; which is absurd ‡. From that
absurdity it follows, that the being
A is not a self-existing and independent
being; but the existence of every
being that is not a self-existing and
independent being, is dependent upon

§ Prop. 16. some other being §; therefore the
Lib. 1. existence of A is dependent upon
some other being, and consequently
the existence of A will be the effect
of that other being upon whom
its existence depends; therefore
the given being A is a dependent
being. Therefore, *if a time can be
assigned, when any given being did
not, or cannot act, that being is a de-
pendent*

pendent being ; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XXXIX.

THEOREM XXXVIII.

Any material being may not, in every part of duration that can be assigned, possess the same powers or qualities.


LET A represent any material being, and BC any part of time, D any point of duration in the time BC, whatever powers or qualities the material being A possesses in the point of duration D: I say, it is possible to assign a time when the material being A will possess powers or qualities, different from what it does possess in the given point of duration D. For let the material being A be supposed in motion in

Q 4

the

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the point of duration D, E, the velocity with which it moves, and F the force of its motion; then will the material being



A, in the point of duration D, be actuated by a particular force, to cause it move with the velocity E*; but the motion of any body may be either an accelerated, a retarded motion, or it may be an equable motion. If the motion of the being A be either accelerated or retarded, then will the force, and consequently the velocity with which A will move, in the point of duration G, posterior to the given point of duration D, be greater or smaller than that which it did move with

* Lemma
2. of this.

with at the point of duration D, and that in proportion to the increment or decrement of force with which it is actuated at the point of duration G*; consequently both the force and velocity of A's motion, in the points of duration D and G, will be different, and therefore the powers or qualities that the material being A possesses, in the points of duration D and G, will not be the same. Again, if the motion of A in the point of duration D, be an equable motion, then may the material being A, in other points of duration, such as G posterior to D, be actuated by a force equal and contrary to that with which it moves in the point of duration D, and consequently the material being A, in the point of duration G, being actuated with two equal

* Lemma 2. of this.

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equal and contrary forces, these forces
 ♣ Ax. 12. will destroy each other's effect* ; but
 Lib. 1. the effect of the force, with which
 the being A was actuated in the point
 of duration D, was the motion with
 which it moved with the velocity E;
 therefore that motion in the point of
 duration G, will be destroyed ; where-
 fore in the points of duration D and
 G, the material being A will not be
 possessed with the same powers or
 qualities. Therefore, *any material
 being may not, in every part of dura-
 tion that can be assigned, possess the
 same powers or qualities ; which was
 to be demonstrated.*

The truth of this proposition is
 confirmed by all experiments that
 can be made on material beings.
 And though we have proved, that
 any

any material being may not possess the same powers or qualities, in every part of duration that can be assigned in the particular quality of motion; yet the same may be demonstrated of any other quality or power matter is endued with, but any one of them is sufficient.

PROPOSITION XL.

THEOREM XXXIX.

A change or mutation may be made on the powers or qualities that matter, or any material being possesses.

LET A be any material being: I say, a change or mutation may be made on the powers or qualities that A possesses.

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esses. For because the powers or qualities that any material being possesses, may not be the same in every part of duration that can be assigned*, therefore the powers or qualities of the being A, in different parts of duration that may be assigned, may not be the same, and consequently the particular powers or qualities that at any given time the being A possesses, may undergo a change or mutation. Therefore, *a change or mutation may be made on the powers or qualities that matter, or any material being possesses; which was to be demonstrated.*

*Prop. 39.
of this.

P R O-

PROPOSITION XLI.

THEOREM XL.

Matter is a dependent being.

BEcause that being, which can have any change or mutation, made on any of the powers or qualities it possesses, is a dependent being *; but a change or mutation can be made on some of the powers or qualities that matter, or any material being possesses †: Therefore, *matter is a dependent being*; which was to be demonstrated.

*Prop. 23.
of this.

†Prop. 40.
of this.

Corollary. From this it follows, that because it was demonstrated, in the fortieth proposition, in the first book, that a time may be assigned

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assigned antecedent to the existence of any dependent being: And it was also proved by the forty fourth proposition of the first book, that a time may be assigned posterior to the existence of every dependent being; and matter by the above proposition being proved to be a dependent being; therefore a time may be assigned, antecedent and posterior to the existence of matter: wherefore the existence of matter had a beginning, and matter may terminate in its existence; and consequently, matter did not exist from all eternity, and to all eternity may not exist.

It is demonstrated from the twenty sixth proposition in this book, that there is only one self-existing and independent

dependent being, that from all eternity existed, and to all eternity will exist: That all the powers, or qualities, which that self-existing and independent being possesses, are infinite, and are subject to no change or mutation: And from the thirty third proposition, and its corollary, and from the thirty first and thirty second propositions it has been demonstrated, that this self-existing and independent being is an active being, and from all eternity did act, and will continue to act to all eternity: That this self-existing and independent being, is the cause of bringing into existence the first temporary being: That this self-existing being is possessed not only of an active power, but also of the powers of thinking, willing, or determining.

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terminating: And from the forty first proposition of this book it has also been demonstrated, that this self-existing and independent being is not matter, but that matter is a temporary being, which cannot have existed from all eternity, and may not to all eternity exist.

The End of the Second Book.



THE

THE
EXISTENCE
OF
G O D

Geometrically Demonstrated.

BOOK III.

DEFINITIONS.

- I. **T**HE primary, or first cause
of beginning, continuing,
or terminating the existence of any
being, is the determination to exert
that power, the exertion whereof pro-
duces an effect, which begins, conti-
nues,

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nues, or terminates, or contributes to the beginning, continuing, or terminating the existence of that being.

II. Secondary causes, are all acts posterior to the primary cause, tending to begin, continue, or terminate the existence of a being.

III. Knowledge, is the distinct idea of the properties and relations of beings, and of their powers and qualities.

IV. Wisdom, is the knowledge of the ends most proper to be attained, and of the means fittest to attain them, with the constant determination to attain those ends, and by those means.

V.

V. Justice, is the constant exercise of power according to wisdom, or the constant application of power in the most fitting manner for the most proper end.



A X I O M S.

I. **N**O being can exert a power which it does not possess.

II. Some being is the primary cause of beginning, continuing, or terminating the existence of every temporary or dependent being.

III. The exertion of any power of any being, cannot be both dependent and independent of the same being.

PROPOSITION I.

THEOREM I.

If any being bring any other being into existence, by the exertion of a power which is not dependent upon itself, but to the immediate act of another being, that being which does exert that power, is not the primary cause of beginning the existence of the other being.

LET the being A  exert a power,  which is not dependent B  upon itself, but upon the immediate act of some other being as B, and that power which A exerts brings the being C into existence: I say, that A is not the primary cause of

of beginning the existence of C. For, if possible, let A be the primary cause of beginning the existence C; but the primary cause of the existence of any being, is the determination to exert that power which brings or contributes to bring the being into existence*; therefore the being A^{* Def. 1. of this.} will determine the exertion of that power that brings C into existence, and consequently the exertion of that power which brings C into existence, is an effect of which the determination of the being A is the cause †, † Def. 25. L. 1. but effects are dependent on the causes that did produce them §, § Ax. 11. L. 1. therefore the exertion of that power that brings C into existence, is dependent on the determination of the being A; but the exertion of the power that brings C into existence,

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• Hyp. stence, is a power that the being A exerts, which is not dependent upon A *, which is absurd. From this absurdity it follows, that A cannot be the primary cause of bringing C into existence. Therefore, *if any being bring any other being into existence, by the exertion of a power which is not dependent upon itself, but to the immediate act of some other being, that being which does exert the power, is not the primary cause of beginning the existence of that other being; which was to be demonstrated.*

PRO-

PROPOSITION II.

THEOREM II.

That being that brings any other being into existence, by the exertion of a power which is not dependent upon the acting of any other being, but from a self-determining power, which is independent of any other being, is the primary cause of beginning the existence of that other being.

LET A represent a being which exerts a power that is not dependent upon the acting of any other being, but by a self-determining power that it possesses independent of any other being, and by the exertion of that power that A

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possesses, let the being B be

brought into existence : I A ○

say, that A is the primary B □

cause of beginning the ex- C ○

istence of B. For, if pos-

sible, let A not be the primary cause

of beginning the existence of B ; then

because B is brought into existence

• Hypoth. by the exertion of A's power*, there-

fore a time may be assigned antecedent

to that exertion of A's power, and con-

sequently antecedent to the beginning

of B's existence, therefore B is a tempo-

† Def. 21. rary being † ; but some being is the

L. 1. primary cause of the beginning of the

‡ Ax. 2. existence of every temporary being ‡,

of this. and since A is not that primary cause,

therefore some other being different

from A will be the primary cause of

beginning B's existence, which let be

C ; then because the primary cause

of

of the beginning of the existence of any being, is the determination to exert that power which begins, or contributes to begin the existence of that being*, therefore the Being C ^{* Def. 1. of this.} will determine the exertion of the power that begins, or contributes to begin the existence of B; but the being A exerts that power †, consequently the power that A exerts in order to begin the existence of B, is the consequence which arises from the determination of the being C; wherefore the exertion of A's power that begins the existence of B, is an effect of which the determination of the being C is the cause‡; but effects ^{† Hyp. ‡ Def. 23. L. 1.} are dependent on the causes that did produce them§: therefore ^{§ Ax. 11. L. 1.} the exertion of the power of A that begins the existence of B, is dependent upon the being C; but the exertion of

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of that power of A, is independent
 • Hyp. of any being whatsoever *, and consequently independent of C; therefore the exertion of the power of A that begins the existence of B, is both dependent and independent of the
 † Ax. 3. same being C, which is absurd †.
 of this.

From this absurdity it follows, that no being different from A can be the primary cause of beginning the existence of B, consequently A is the primary cause of beginning the existence of the being B. Therefore,
that being that brings any other being into existence, by the exertion of a power which is not dependent on any other being but from a self-determining power, which is independent of any other being, is the primary cause of beginning the existence of that other being; which was to be demonstrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION III.

THEOREM III.

The exertion of the power of that being which brings any other being into existence, and is not the primary cause of beginning the existence of that other being, is dependent upon the acting of some other being.

LET A and B be two. A $\odot$
 beings, and let B be B $\square$
 brought into existence by
 the exertion of a power in A, but let
 A not be the primary cause of begin-
 ning the existence of B: I say, that
 the exertion of that power of A is
 dependent on the acting of some
 other being. For because the begin-
 ning of B's existence is an effect of
 which

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which the exertion of the power of
* Def. 25. A is the cause *, and the cause of
L. 1. exertion of that power which is the
cause of any effect, is either a self-
determining power or volition in
the being itself, or the immediate
pressure or influence of some other
being on that being that does exert
† Prop. 29. that power †; therefore the cause of
L. 1. the exertion of that power of A which
brings B into existence, will either
be a self-determining power in the
being A, or the immediate pressure
or influence of some other being on
A. If it be possible, let the cause of
the exertion of that power of A be
a self-determining power, and inde-
pendent of any other being; then
because that being that brings any
other being into existence by the exer-
tion of a power, which is not depen-
dent

dent upon the acting of another being, but by a self-determining power which is independent of any other being, is the primary cause of beginning that being's existence^{*}; wherefore A will be the primary cause of beginning the existence of B, which is absurd[†]; therefore the exertion^{† Hyp.} of that power of A that brings B into existence, is not from a self-determining power, and independent of any other being, and consequently A will exert that power by the immediate pressure or influence of some other being[‡]. Therefore, *the exertion of the power of that being which brings any other being into existence, and is not the primary cause of beginning its existence, is dependent upon the acting of some other being; which was to be demonstrated.*

^{*} Prop. 2.
of this.

[†] Hyp.

[‡] Prop. 29.
L. 2.

P R O-

PROPOSITION IV.

THEOREM IV.

The power which is exerted by that being, which is the primary cause of bringing any other being into existence, arises from a self-determining power which the being itself possesses, and independent of any other being.

LET A and B be two beings, and let A be the primary cause of beginning the existence of B: I say, that the power that A exerts to bring B into existence, is from a self-determining power, and independent of any other being. For because the beginning of B's existence is an effect

fect of which A is the cause *, there-^{* Hyp.}
fore A will exert a power that does
bring B into existence †; but the exer-<sup>† Def. 23.
L. 1.</sup>
tion of that power which is the cause
of any effect, is either a self-deter-
mining power or volition in the be-
ing itself, or dependent upon the
immediate pressure or influence of
some other being on that being which
exerts it †; therefore the exertion of<sup>† Prop. 29.
L. 2.</sup>
that power of A which brings B into
existence, is either a self-determi-
ning power which A possesses, or
dependent upon the immediate pres-
sure or influence of some other be-
ing. If it be possible, let the exer-
tion of that power in A be dependent
upon the immediate pressure or in-
fluence of some other being; then
because that being that brings any
other being into existence by the
exertion

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exertion of a power which is dependent upon the immediate pressure or influence of some other being, cannot be the primary cause of beginning the existence of that other being *; wherefore A cannot be the primary cause of beginning the existence of B, which is absurd†; therefore the exertion of that power of A that brings B into existence, cannot be from the immediate pressure or influence of any other being, and consequently that power which A exerts, and by which B is brought into existence, is a self-determining power, and independent of any other being. Therefore, *the power which is exerted by that being, which is the primary cause of bringing any other being into existence, arises from a self-determining power which the being*

* Prop. I.
of this.

† Hyp.

ing itself possesses, independent of any other being; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION V.

THEOREM V.

Matter cannot be the primary cause of beginning the existence of any being.

FOR let A be any A ○
material being B □
which exerts a power, C ○

so as to bring any other
being, as B, into existence: I say, that
A is not the primary cause of beginning the existence of B. For because
matter is a dependent being*, and its
existence is the effect of some other
being, which let be C; therefore the
S existence

* Prop. 41.
L. 2.

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existence of A is an effect of which the being C is the cause : ~~but effects~~ are dependent on the causes ~~that did~~

• Ax. 11.
L. 1.

produce them *; therefore the existence of A is dependent upon C, and the existence of any dependent being cannot be continued without being actuated by that being upon which

† Prop. 18.
L. 1.

its existence depends †; therefore A cannot be continued in its existence without being actuated by C; and consequently, if A be not actuated by C, it will terminate in its existence. Now because A is actuated by C, in all the points of duration in which it exists, wherefore in those points of duration in which A exerted that power which did bring B into existence, it was actuated by C. Again, since A can exert no power without it exist †, and that existence is dependent upon its

† Prop. 1.
and 32.
L. 1.

its being actuated by C, therefore the exertion of any power of A will be dependent upon its being actuated by C, and consequently will be dependent upon the acting of C ; therefore the exertion of the power of the material being A, which did bring B into existence, will be dependent upon the immediate act of the being C ; but that being that brings any other being into existence, by the exertion of a power which is dependent upon the immediate act of some other being, is not the primary cause of beginning its existence * ; wherefore the material being A is not the primary cause of beginning the existence of B. Therefore, *matter cannot be the primary cause of beginning the existence of any being ;* which was to be demonstrated.

* Prop. 1.
of this.

PROPOSITION VI.

THEOREM VI.

Any dependent being cannot be the primary cause of beginning the existence of any other being.

LET A be a dependent being, which exerts a power, so as to bring any other being, as B, into existence : I say, that A is not the primary cause of beginning the existence of B. For because A is a dependent being, its existence is the

* Def. 27. effect of some other being*, which let
L. 1. be C ; wherefore the existence of A

† Def. 25. is an effect of which C is the cause †,
L. 1. but effects are dependent upon the

‡ Ax. 11. causes that did produce them ‡, there-
L. 1. fore

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fore the existence of A is dependent upon C; but the existence of any dependent being cannot be continued without being actuated by that being on which its existence depends*; therefore A cannot be continued in its existence without being actuated by C, and consequently if A be not actuated by C, it will terminate in its existence: Now because A is actuated by C in all the points of duration in which it exists, wherefore in these points of duration in which A exerted that power that did bring B into existence, it must have been actuated by C. Again, since A can exert no power without it exist †, and that existence is dependent on its being actuated by C; therefore the exertion of any power of A will be dependent on its being actuated by C, that

*Prop. 18.

L. 1.

†Prop. 1.
and Prop.
32. L. 1.

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is, upon the acting of C, and consequently the power that A did exert, which brought B into existence, will be dependent upon the immediate act of C; but that being which brings any other being into existence, by the exertion of a power which is dependent upon the immediate act of some other being, cannot be the primary cause of beginning the existence of that other being †; wherefore A is not the primary cause of beginning the existence of B.

†Prop. 1.
of this.

Therefore, *any dependent being cannot be the primary cause of beginning the existence of any other being*; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION VII.

THEOREM VII.

The only one self-existing and independent being, is the primary cause of beginning the existence of every other being.

FOR because some being will be the primary cause of beginning the existence of every being, which is not the self-existing being^{*}: I say, ^{* Ax. 2. of this.} that being which is the primary cause, is the only one self-existing and independent being. For if it be possible for the self-existing and independent being not to be the primary cause of any one dependent being, let that being be A. Now since some being is the primary cause of beginning the existence of A[†], let ^{† Ax. 2. of this.}

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that

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that being be B, and B is
not the self-existing and A ○

* Hyp. independent being*; but B □
the existence of every be-
ing that is not self-existing, is de-

† Prop. 16. L. 1. pendent on some other being†;
wherefore the existence of B is de-
pendent on some other being, and
consequently the existence of B is
the effect of that other being upon
which its existence depends, there-

‡ Def. 27. L. 1. fore B is a dependent being‡: but
B is the primary cause of begin-
ning the existence of A, where-
fore a dependent being may be the
primary cause of being the existence
of some other being, which is ab-

§ Prop. 6. of this. surd§; therefore B cannot be the
primary cause of beginning the ex-
istence of A, and consequently no
being can be the primary cause of
beginning the existence of A, but the

the only one self-existing and independent being. Therefore, *the only one self-existing and independent being, is the primary cause of beginning the existence of every being*; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION VIII.

THEOREM VIII.

That being which continues any other being in its existence, by the exertion of a power which is not dependent upon itself, but upon the acting of some other being, is not the primary cause of continuing it in its existence.

LET A and B be two beings, and let A exert a power that continues B in its existence, the exertion of which power is not dependent on A, but upon the acting of some other

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other being, which let
be C: I say, the be- A 
ing A is not the primary C 
cause of continuing the B 
being B in its existence.

For, if possible, let A be the primary
cause that continues the being B in
its existence; then because the pri-
mary cause of continuing the existence
of any being, is the determination
to exert that power, the exertion where-
of produces an effect that continues or
contributes to continue the existence
of that being *; therefore the being
A will determine the exertion of that
power that continues B in its ex-
istence, and consequently the exer-
tion of that power which continues
B in its existence, is an effect of
which the determination of the being

* Def. 1.
of this.

† Def. 25.
L. 1.

A is the cause †: but effects are de-
pendent upon the causes that did
produce

Geometrically Demonstrated. 267

produce them * ; therefore the exertion of that power which continues B in its existence, is dependent upon the determination of the being A ; that is, the exertion of the power of A, which continues B in its existence, is dependent upon A ; but the exertion of that power of A that continues B in its existence, is not dependent upon A † ; therefore the exertion of that power of A which continues B in its existence, is both dependent and independent of A, which is absurd ‡. From that absurdity it follows, that A cannot be the primary cause of continuing B in its existence. Therefore, *that being which continues any being in its existence, by the exertion of a power which is not dependent upon itself, but upon the acting of some other being,*
is

* Ax. 11.
L. 1.

† Hyp.

‡ Ax. 3.
of this.

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is not the primary cause of continuing it in its existence ; which was to be demonstrated.

This proposition may otherwise be demonstrated thus.

LET A and B be A ○
 two beings, D, C, E ○
 any portion of time, B □
 and let A exert a power C F D
 that continues B in its ———
 existence by the immediate act of E: I say, that A is not the primary cause of continuing the existence of B. For because A exerts a power that does continue B in its existence *, wherefore the existence of B is dependent on A †, and therefore B cannot continue to exist without the exertion of that

* Hyp.

† Prop. 25.
 L. 1.

that power which A possesses to continue B in its existence *, and con-^{* Prop. 18.}
frequently in all the points of dura-^{L. 1.}
tion that B continues to exist, it will be actuated by the exertion of that power of A. Now since B must be successively actuated in all the points of duration in which it continues to exist by the exertion of A's power; let any point of duration be assumed in the time C, D, such as F, which terminates the effect of any one act or exertion of A; wherefore if at the point of duration F, A should cease to exert that power, the existence of B would terminate in the same point of duration F †; but if^{† Prop. 18.}
A should continue to exert that^{L. 1.}
power after the point of duration F in the time F, D, then will the being B begin to be actuated by the exertion

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tion of that power in the same point of duration F, and therefore B may be conceived in the point of duration F to begin to exist. Now since B begins to exist by the exertion of the power of A that is owing to the immediate act of the being E: But that being that begins the existence of any other being, by the exertion of a power which is owing to the immediate act of some other being, is not the primary cause of beginning its existence *; wherefore A is not the primary cause of beginning the existence of B, that is, A is not the primary cause of B's existence in the point of duration F; after the same manner it may be demonstrated, that A is not the primary cause of B's existing in all the other points of duration

• Prop. 1.
of this.

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duration in which it continues to exist; that is, A is not the primary cause of continuing B in its existence, but A exerts that power that continues B in its existence, by the immediate act of some other being. Therefore, *that being that continues any other being in its existence, by the exertion of a power, &c.* which was to be demonstrated.

PRO-

PROPOSITION IX.

THEOREM IX.

That being which continues any other being in its existence, by the exertion of a power which is not dependent upon the acting of any other being, but from a self-determining power which is independent of any other being, is the primary cause of continuing the existence of that other being.

LET A represent a being, which exerts a power that is not dependent upon the acting of any other being, but from a self-determining power it possesses independent of any other being, and by the exertion of that power of A let the being B be
con-

Geometrically Demonstrated. 273

continued in its existence: I say, that A  is the primary cause of continuing B in its existence. For because B 

C 

continues to exist by the exertion of the power which A possesses *, there-^{* Hyp.} fore B will be actuated by the exertion of that power which A possesses in all the points of duration in which it exists, and consequently by the exertion or non-exertion of that power which A possesses, B will continue or terminate in its existence; therefore the continuation of B's existence is an effect of which the exertion of the power which A possesses is the cause†: but that being whose existence is the effect of some other being, is a dependent being†; where-^{† Def. 23. and 25. L. 1.} fore B is a dependent being. Again,

T

because

† Def. 27. L. 1.

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• Ax. 2.
of this.

† Def. 1.
of this.

† Hyp.

because B is a dependent or temporary being, some being will be the primary cause of the continuation of its existence * : if possible, let that being be some other being than A, as C ; then because the primary cause of the continuation of the existence of any being, is the determination to exert that power which produces an effect, which effect continues or contributes to continue the being in its existence † ; therefore the being C will determine the exertion of the power that continues B in its existence ; but the being A exerts that power ‡, consequently the power which A exerts in order to continue C in its existence, is the consequence which arises from the determination of the being C ; wherefore the exertion of A's power which continues B in its existence,

existence, is an effect of which the determination of the being C is the cause *: but effects are dependent ^{* Def. 23. and 25.} upon the causes that did produce ^{L. 1.} them †; wherefore the exertion of ^{† Ax. 11. L. 1.} A's power that continues B in its existence, is dependent on the being C, but the exertion of that power of A is independent of any other being whatsoever ‡, and consequently ^{‡ Hyp.} independent of C; wherefore the exertion of A's power which continues B in its existence, is both dependent and independent of the same being C, which is absurd §. ^{§ Ax. 3. of this.} From this absurdity it follows, that no being different from A can be the primary cause of continuing B in its existence, consequently A is the primary cause of continuing the existence of B. Therefore, *that being*

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ence of some other being on A. If it be possible, let the exertion of the power of A be a self-determining power which A possesses independent of any other being; then because that being that continues any other being in its existence, by the exertion of a power that is self-determining and independent of any other being, is the primary cause of continuing it in its existence *; therefore A will be the primary cause of continuing B in its existence, which is absurd †; wherefore the exertion of the power in A that continues B in its existence, is not owing to a self-determining power which A possesses independent of any other being, and consequently the exertion of that power of A that continues B in its existence, is dependent on the immediate preference or influence of some other being

*Prop. 9.
of this.

† Hyp.

ing that is the acting of some other being*. Therefore, *the exertion of* * Def. 22. and 37. L. 1. *the power of that being that continues any other being in its existence, and which is not the primary cause of continuing it in its existence, is dependent upon the acting of some other being; which was to be demonstrated.*

PROPOSITION XI.

THEOREM XI.

The power that is exerted by that being which is the primary cause of continuing any other being in its existence, arises from a self-determining power which the being possesses, independent of any other being.

LET A and B be two beings, and let A be the primary cause of

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con-

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continuing B in its existence: I say, the power that A exerts to continue

A ○

B □

B in its existence, is a self-determining power which A possesses independent of any other being. For because the continuation of B's existence is

• Hyp.

an effect whereof A is the cause*, therefore A will exert a power that does continue A in its existence; but the exertion of that power that is the cause of an effect, is either owing to a self-determining power in the being itself, or to the immediate pressure or influence of some other being

† Prop. 29.
L. 2.

on that being which exerts it †; therefore the exertion of the power of A that continues B in its existence, is either owing to a self-determining power which A possesses, or to the immediate pressure or influence of some other

other being on A. If it be possible, let the exertion of that power which A exerts to continue B in its existence, be owing to the immediate pressure or influence of some other being upon it; then because that being that continues any other being in its existence, by the exertion of a power which is owing to the immediate pressure or influence of some other being, that is by the acting of some other being*, is not the primary cause of continuing that other being in its existence†; wherefore A is not the primary cause of continuing B in its existence, which is absurd‡; therefore the exertion of that power of A that continues B in its existence, is not owing to the immediate pressure or influence of some other being, and consequently that

* Def. 23.
and 25.
L. 1.

† Prop. 8.
of this.

‡ Hyp.

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that power that A exerts, and by which B is continued in its existence, is a self-determining power which A possesses independent of any other being*.

• Prop. 29.
L. 2. and
its Cor.

Therefore, *if any being be the primary cause of continuing any other being in its existence, the exertion of the power of that being by which the other being is continued in its existence, is owing to a self-determining power which the being possesses, independent of any other being; which was to be demonstrated.*

P R O-

PROPOSITION XII.

THEOREM XII.

*Matter cannot be the primary cause
of continuing the existence of any
being.*

LET A be any ma- A $\odot$
terial being that C $\odot$
exerts a power, so as B $\square$
to continue any other
being, as B, in its existence: I say,
that A cannot be the primary cause
of continuing B in its existence.
For because matter is a dependent
being *, and its existence is the ef- * Prop. 41.
fect of some other being †, which L. 2.
let be C; therefore the existence of † Def. 27.
A is an effect of which the being C is L. 1.
the cause ‡: but effects are depen- ‡ Def. 23,
dent L. 1. and 25.

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dependent upon the causes that did produce them *, therefore the existence of A is dependent upon C, and the existence of any dependent being cannot be continued without being actuated by that being upon which its existence depends †; therefore A cannot be continued in its existence without being actuated by C; and consequently if A be not actuated by C, it will terminate in its existence. Now because A is actuated by C, in all the points of duration in which it exists, wherefore in those points of duration in which A exerts that power by which B is continued in its existence, it was actuated by C. Again, since A can exert no power without it exist ‡, and that existence is dependent upon its being actuated by C, therefore the exertion of any power

* Ax. 11.
 L. 1.

† Prop. 18
 L. 1.

* Prop. 1.
 and 32.
 L. 1.

power of A, will be dependent upon its being actuated by C, and consequently will be dependent upon the acting of C; therefore the exertion of that power of the material being A, that does continue B in its existence, is owing to the acting of the being C[†]; but that<sup>† Def. 22.
L. 1.</sup> being which continues any other being in its existence, by the exertion of a power that is dependent on the acting of some other being, is not the primary cause of continuing it in its existence^{*}; wherefore the material being A cannot be the primary cause of continuing B in its existence. Therefore, *matter cannot be the primary cause of continuing any being in its existence*; which was to be demonstrated.<sup>*Prop. 8.
of this.</sup>

PROPOSITION XIII.

THEOREM XIII.

Any dependent being cannot be the primary cause of continuing any other being in its existence.

LET A be a de- A ○
 pendent being, C. ○
 which exerts a power, B □
 so as to continue any
 other being, as B, in its existence: I
 say, that, A cannot be the primary
 cause of continuing B in its exist-
 ence. For because A is a dependent
 being, its existence is the effect of
 some other being*, which let be C;
 wherefore the existence of the being
 A is an effect of which the being C
 is the cause†: but effects are de-
 pendent

* Def. 27.
 L. 1.

† Def. 23.
 and 25.
 L. 1.

pendent upon the causes which did produce them*, therefore the existence of A is dependent upon the being C; but the existence of any being cannot be continued without being actuated by that being on which its existence depends†; therefore A cannot be continued in its existence without being actuated by C, and consequently if A be not actuated by C, it will terminate in its existence. Now because A is actuated by C, in all the points of duration in which it exists, wherefore in all the points of duration in which it exerted that power that continued B in its existence, it will have been actuated by C, consequently the power that A exerts, which does continue B in its existence, is owing to the immediate pressure or influence of C, that is, to the acting

* Ax. 11.
L. 1.

† Prop. 18.
L. 1.

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acting of C; but that being which exerts a power that does continue any other being in its existence, which is owing to the acting of any other being, cannot be the primary cause of continuing that other being in its existence*; wherefore A cannot be the primary cause of continuing B in its existence. Therefore, *any dependent being cannot be the primary cause of continuing any being in its existence*; which was to be demonstrated.

• Prop. 8.
 of this.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XIV.

THEOREM XIV.

The only one self-existing and independent being, is the primary cause of continuing the existence of every being.

FOR some being will be the primary cause of continuing the existence of every being, otherwise there would be an effect produced, to wit, the continuation of the being without a cause, which is absurd* ; wherefore since some being will be the primary cause of continuing the existence of every being : I say, that being is the only one self-existing and independent being. For, if it be possible, for the

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only

• Ax. 1.
L. 1.

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only one self-existing and independent being not to be the primary cause of continuing the existence of any one being, which let

be A; now because some $A \odot$ being is the primary cause $B \square$ of the continuation of the

existence of A, which let be B; then since the being is not the self-exist-

† Hyp. ing and independent being †, but the existence of every being that is not self-existing and independent, is

† Prop. 16. dependent on some other being †;
L. 1.

wherefore the existence of B is dependent on some other being, and consequently the existence of B is the effect of some other being,

* Def. 27. that is, B is a dependent being *;

L. 1. but B is the primary cause of continuing the existence of A, wherefore a dependent being may be

the

Geometrically Demonstrated. 291

the primary cause of continuing the existence of some other being, which is absurd †; therefore B can-
†Prop. 13. of this,
not be the primary cause of continuing the existence of A, and consequently no being can be the primary cause of continuing the existence of A, but the only one self-existing and independent being. Therefore, *the only one self-existing and independent being, is the primary cause of continuing the existence of every being; which was to be demonstrated.*

PROPOSITION XV.

THEOREM XV.

That being, which exerts a power by the immediate act of some other being, whereby the existence of another being is terminated, that being is not the primary cause of terminating the existence of that other being.

LET A and B be $A \odot$
 two beings, and $C \odot$
 let A exert a power by B $\square$
 the immediate act of
 some other being, as C, so as to terminate the existence of B: I say, that A is not the primary cause of terminating the existence of B. For, if possible, let A be the primary cause of terminating the existence of B;
 then

then because the primary cause of terminating the existence of any other being, is the determination to exert that power, the exertion whereof produces an effect, which terminates, or contributes to terminate, the existence of the being * ; therefore A can determine the exertion of that power which terminates the existence of B, and therefore A can act in opposition to that power which is the primary cause of continuing the existence of B, so as to destroy its effect ; but the primary cause of continuing any being in its existence, is the self-existing and independent being † ; wherefore A can act in opposition to the acting of the self-existing and independent being, so as to destroy its effect, and consequently the exertion of that power of A is equal and

* Def. 1.
of this.

† Prop. 9.
of this.

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contrary to the exertion of the power of the self-existing and independent being, because nothing can destroy the exertion of that power but the exertion of one which is equal and

* Ax. 12. contrary to it *. Again, because A
L. 1.

terminates the existence of B, by the
† Hyp. immediate act of C †; therefore A
will be pressed upon or influenced by
C, in order to exert that power by
which the existence of B is termi-

† Def. 22. nated †, that is, A will be pressed
L. 1. upon or influenced by the exertion
of the powers or qualities of C; but
any being that is pressed upon or in-
fluenced by the exertion of the pow-
ers or qualities of another being, is a

§ Prop. 24. dependent being §, therefore A is a
L. 2. dependent being: but it has been
demonstrated, that the exertion of
A's power can destroy the exertion of
the

the self-existing and independent being, therefore the self-existing and independent being may be influenced by the exertion of the power of the dependent being A ; but any being that can be influenced by the exertion of any of the powers or qualities of another being, is a dependent being*, wherefore the self-existing and independent being is a dependent being, which is absurd. From this absurdity it follows, that A cannot be the primary cause of terminating the existence of B. Therefore, *that being which exerts a power, so as to terminate the existence of any other being, by the immediate act of some other being, that being which does exert that power, is not the primary cause of terminating the existence*

* Prop. 24.
L. 2.

U 4

istence of that other being; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XVI.

THEOREM XVI.

That being which terminates the existence of any other being, by the exertion of a power which is not dependent upon the acting of any other being, but from a self-determining power which it possesses independent of any other being, is the primary cause of terminating the existence of that other being.

LET A represent a being, which exerts a power that is not dependent upon the acting of any other being, but by a self-determining power which it possesses independent of any

any other being, and
by the exertion of that
power which A posses-
ses, let the existence of
the being B be termi-

A ○

B □

C ○

nated: I say, that A is the primary
cause of terminating the existence of

B. For, if possible, let A not be the
primary cause of terminating the ex-

istence of B; then because the exist-

ence of B is terminated by the exer-

tion of A's power *, therefore a time *^{Hyp.}

may be assigned posterior to the ter-

mination of the existence of B; but

that being posterior to whose exist-

ence a time may be assigned, is a

dependent being †, therefore B is a

†Prop. 42.
L. 1.

dependent being; but some being is
the primary cause of terminating the
existence of any temporary or depen-

†Ax. 2.
of this,

primary

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primary cause, therefore some other being different from A will be the primary cause of terminating the existence of B, which let be C; then because the primary cause of terminating the existence of any being, is the determination to exert that power, the exertion whereof produces an effect, which terminates or contributes to terminate the existence of that being^{*}; therefore the being C will determine the exertion of that power which terminates the existence of B, but the being A exerts that power[†], consequently the power which A exerts in order to terminate the existence of B, is the consequence which arises from the determination of the being C; wherefore the exertion of A's power which terminates the existence of B, is an effect

^{*} Def. 1.
of this.

[†] Hyp.

effect of which the determination of the being C is the cause *; but effects are dependent on the causes that

* Def. 23. and 25. L. 1.

did produce them †; therefore the exertion of the power of A, which

† Ax. 11. L. 1.

terminates the existence of B, is dependent upon the being C; but the exertion of that power of A is independent of any being whatsoever ‡, ‡ Hyp.

and consequently the exertion of that power of A, which terminates the existence of B, is independent of C; therefore the exertion of that power of A, which terminates the existence of B, is both dependent and independent of the same being C, which

is absurd §. From this absurdity it follows, that no being different from

§ Ax. 3. of this.

A can be the primary cause of terminating the existence of B, consequently A is the primary cause of termi-

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terminating the existence of B. Therefore, *that being which terminates the existence of any other being, by the exertion of a power which is not dependent upon the acting of any other being, but from a self-determining power, which it possesses independent of any other being, is the primary cause of terminating the existence of that other being; which was to be demonstrated.*

PRO-

PROPOSITION XVII.

THEOREM XVII.

The exertion of that power that terminates the existence of any other being, but is not the primary cause of terminating it in its existence, is owing to the immediate act of some other being.

LET A and B be two A $\odot$
beings, and let A B $\square$
terminate the existence of
B, but is not the primary cause of
terminating its existence: I say, that
the exertion of the power of A that
does terminate B's existence, is owing
to the immediate act of some
other being. For because the terminating
of B's existence is an effect
pro-

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produced, of which the exertion of
 * Def. 25. the power of A is the cause * ; but
 L. 1. the exertion of the power that is
 the cause of any effect, is either ow-
 ing to a self-determining power or
 volition in the being itself, or to the
 immediate pressure or influence of
 some other being upon the being that
 † Prop. 29. does exert that power † ; therefore
 L. 2. the exertion of the power of A, that
 terminates the existence of B, is ei-
 ther a self-determining power in A, or
 owing to the immediate pressure or
 influence of some other being on it.
 If it be possible, let the exertion of
 the power of A be a self-determining
 power, and independent of any other
 being; then because that being that
 terminates the existence of any other
 being, by the exertion of a power
 which is self-determining and inde-
 pendent

pendent of any other being, is the
 primary cause of terminating its ex-
 istence*, wherefore A is the pri- <sup>*Prop. 16.
of this.</sup>
 mary cause of terminating the exist-
 ence of B, which is absurd †; there- ^{† Hyp.}
 fore the exertion of the power of A,
 that terminates the existence of B, is
 not a self-determining power, and in-
 dependent of any other being, and
 therefore is owing to the pressure
 or influence of some other being‡, and <sup>‡ Prop. 29.
L. 2. and
its Cor.</sup>
 consequently the exertion of the pow-
 er of A, which terminates the exist-
 ence of B, is owing to the act of
 some other beings. Therefore, <sup>§ Def. 22.
L. 1.</sup> the
 exertion of that power that termi-
 nates the existence of any other being,
 but is not the primary cause of ter-
 minating it in its existence, is owing
 to the immediate act of some other be-
 ing; which was to be demonstrated.

P R O-

PROPOSITION XVIII.

THEOREM XVIII.

The power that is exerted by that being that terminates the existence of any other being, and is the primary cause of terminating it, is a self-determining power which that being possesses, independent of any other being.

LET A and B be two beings, and let A be the primary cause of terminating the existence of B: I say, that the power which A exerts to terminate the existence of B, is a self-determining power which A possesses independent of any other being. For because the terminating of B's existence is an effect of which the exertion of the power

power that A possesses is the cause * ; * Def. 25.
but the exertion of the power that is ^{L. 1.}
the cause of any effect, is either
owing to a self-determining power,
and independent of any other being
in the being itself, or to the im-
mediate pressure and influence of some
other being on the being that exerts
it † ; therefore that power that A <sup>† Prop. 29.
L. 2.</sup>
exerts for the terminating of the ex-
istence of B, is either a self-determining
power which A possesses, or is owing to
the immediate pressure or influence of
some other being on A. And, if pos-
sible, let the exertion of that power
of A, by which the existence of B is
terminated, be owing to the im-
mediate pressure or influence of some
other being on A ; then because the
act of any being is the exertion of
that power by which it presses upon

X

or

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or influences itself or any other being^{*}, therefore the exertion of the power of A, which terminates the existence of B, is owing to the immediate act of some other being; but any being that terminates the existence of any other being by the exertion of a power that is owing to the immediate act of some other being, is not the primary cause of terminating its existence[†]; therefore A cannot be the primary cause of terminating the existence of B, which is absurd[‡]; consequently the power that A exerts, for the terminating of B's existence, is a self-determining power which A possesses, independent of any other being. Therefore, *if any being be the primary cause of terminating the existence of any other being, the power that it exerts for the*
termi-

* Def. 22.
L. 1.

† Prop. 15.
of this.

‡ Hyp.

termination of that other being's existence, is a self-determining power, which it possesses independent of any other being; which was to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION XIX.

THEOREM XIX.

Matter cannot be the primary cause of terminating the existence of any being.

LET A be any A 
 material being, C 
 which exerts a power, B 
 so as to terminate the
 existence of any other being, as B:
 I say, A cannot be the primary
 cause of terminating the existence

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of the being B. For because matter
^{° Prop. 41.}
^{L. 2.} is a dependent being*, and its ex-
 istence is the effect of some other be-
^{† Def. 27.}
^{L. 1.} ing †, which let be C; therefore the
 existence of the material being A is
 an effect, of which the being C is the.
^{† Def. 23.}
^{and 25.}
^{L. 1.} cause †: but effects are dependent
 upon the causes that did produce
^{§ Ax. 11.}
^{L. 1.} them §; therefore the existence of A
 is dependent upon C, and the exist-
 ence of any dependent being cannot
 be continued, without being actuated
 by that being upon which its existence
^{¶ Prop. 18.}
^{L. 1.} depends ||; therefore A cannot be
 continued in its existence, without
 being actuated by C, and consequently
 if A be not actuated by C, it will
 terminate in its existence. Now be-
 cause A is actuated by C, in all the
 points of duration in which it exists,
 where-

wherefore in these points of duration, in which A exerted that power that terminated the existence of B, it was actuated by C. Again, since A can exert no power without it exist*, and that existence is dependent upon its being actuated by C; therefore the exertion of any power of A, will be dependent upon its being actuated by C, and consequently will be dependent upon the immediate acting of C; therefore the exertion of that power of the material being A, that terminated the existence of C, is dependent upon the immediate act of C; but any being that terminates the existence of any other being, by the exertion of a power which is dependent upon the

* Prop. 1.
and Prop.
32. L. 1.

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immediate act of some other being,
is not the primary cause of termi-
nating the existence of that other be-

†Prop. 15.
of this.

ing†; therefore the material being
A is not the primary cause of termi-
nating the existence of B. There-
fore, *matter cannot be the primary
cause of terminating the existence of
any being; which was to be demon-
strated.*


P R O-

PROPOSITION XX.

THEOREM XX.

A dependent being cannot be the primary cause of terminating the existence of any being.

LET A be a dependent being, which exerts a power, so as to terminate the exist-



ence of B: I say, that A is not the primary cause of terminating the existence of B. For because A is a dependent being, its existence is the effect on some other being*, which let be C; but the existence of any dependent being cannot be continued, without being actuated by that being on which its existence depends †; there-

^{*} Def. 27.
L. 1.

[†] Prop. 18.
L. 1.

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therefore A cannot continue in its existence, without being actuated by C. Now because A is actuated by C, in all the points of duration in which it exists, wherefore in these points of duration, in which it terminates the existence of B, it will be actuated by C, and consequently the power that A exerts, for the terminating of B's existence, will be dependent upon the pressure or influence of C, that is, to the acting of C * ; but that being that exerts a power, so as to terminate the existence of any other being, by the immediate pressure or influence of some other being, that is, by the immediate act of some other being, is not the primary cause of terminating its existence † ; wherefore the dependent being A is not the primary cause of terminating the existence

* Def. 22.
L. 1.

† Prop. 15,
of this.

existence of the being B. Therefore, *a dependent being cannot be the primary cause of terminating the existence of any other being; which was to be demonstrated.*

PROPOSITION XXI.

THEOREM XXI.

The only one self-existing and independent being, is the primary cause of terminating the existence of every being.

FOR some being will be the primary cause of terminating the existence of every being that does or will terminate * ; wherefore since * Ax. 2. of this. some being will be the primary cause of terminating the existence of every being that did, does, or will terminate

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nate in its existence : I say, that being which is the primary cause of these effects, is the only one self-existing and independent being. For if it be possible for the only one self-existing and independent being, not to be the primary cause of terminating the existence of any one being, let that being be A,

and let B be the primary cause of terminating its existence; then because B is

not the self-existing and independent

* Hyp. being * ; but the existence of every being that is not self-existing and independent, is dependent on some

† Prop. 16. other being † ; wherefore the existence of B is dependent on some other being, and its existence will be the effect of that other being, upon which its existence depends ; wherefore B is

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a de-

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a dependent being*: but any dependent being cannot be the primary cause of terminating the existence of any other being†, therefore B cannot be the primary cause of terminating the existence of A; and after the same manner it may be demonstrated, that no being can be the primary cause of terminating the existence of A, but the only one self-existing and independent being. Therefore, *the only one self-existing and independent being, is the primary cause of terminating the existence of every being, that ever did, does, or will terminate in its existence; which was to be demonstrated.*

*Def. 27.
L. 1.

†Prop. 20.
of this.

PRO-

PROPOSITION XXII.

THEOREM XXII.

The self-existing and independent being is possessed of knowledge.

• Def. 3.
of this.

FOR since knowledge is the distinct idea of the properties and relations of being, and of their powers and qualities *; if it were possible for the self-existing and independent being not to have a distinct idea of the properties and relations of beings, and of their powers or qualities, then the powers or qualities which a self-existing and independent being possesses, could be augmented in order to receive a distinct idea of the properties and the relations of beings, and of their powers

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powers or qualities, which is absurd*. <sup>*Prop. 13.
L. 2.</sup>

From this absurdity it follows, that the self-existing and independent being does possess a distinct idea of the properties and relations of beings, and of their powers or qualities, which is knowledge†. There- <sup>† Def. 3.
of this.</sup> fore, *the self-existing and independent being is possessed of knowledge; which was to be demonstrated.*

PRO-

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PROPOSITION XXIII.

THEOREM XXIII.

The self-existent and independent being can use the properest means for producing of any effect, or for bringing any being into existence.

LET A represent the self-existent and independent being, and B any other being: I say, that A can use the properest means for producing the existence of B; for if A cannot use the properest means for producing the existence of B, then will the powers or qualities which A possesses, have certain limits or boundaries; but A is the self-existing and inde-

independent being, and the powers or qualities it possesses have no limits or boundaries*, consequently the powers of A are limited and not limited, which is absurd; wherefore A can use the properest means for bringing the being B into existence, or for producing of any effect. Therefore, *the self-existing and independent being can use the properest means for producing of any effect, or for bringing any being into existence; which was to be demonstrated.*

*Prop. 17.
L. 2.

PROPOSITION XXIV.

THEOREM XXIV.

The self-existent and independent being, constantly uses the most proper means for producing of any effect, or for bringing any being into existence.

FOR by the twenty second proposition of this book the self-existent and independent being knows the most proper means for producing any effect, and the powers or qualities of the self-existent and independent being admit of no change or mutation *; therefore the self-existent and independent being either constantly does, or never can use the most proper means to produce any effect,

* Prop. 15.
L. 2.

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effect, or for bringing any being into existence, because if the self-existent and independent being sometimes did not use the most proper means, and at other times did, then the self-existent and independent being would change, which is absurd* ; but the self-existent being can use the most proper means for producing any effect†.

* Prop. 15.
L. 2.

† Prop. 23.
of this.

Therefore, the self-existent and independent being, constantly uses the most proper means for producing if any effect, or for bringing any being into existence; which was to be demonstrated.

Y P R O-

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PROPOSITION XXV.

THEOREM XXV.

The self-existing and independent being is possessed of wisdom.

BECAUSE the self-determining power of the self-existing and independent being is the primary cause of beginning, continuing, or terminating the existence of every being that ever did or can exist, or that ever did or will terminate in its existence *; therefore the beginning, continuing, or terminating the existence of every being that ever did or can exist, or ever did or will terminate, are effects produced of which the self-determining power of the self-existing and independent being is

* Prop. 7, 14, and 21 of this.

Geometrically Demonstrated. 323

is the cause; but the self-determining power is the power of acting according to the will *, which is the determination of acting †; therefore the primary cause of beginning, continuing, or terminating the existence of every being that ever did or can exist, or that ever did or will terminate in its existence, is the self-existent and independent being's determination to act; and the self-existent and independent being is possessed of knowledge ‡, and therefore knows the ends most proper to be attained, and the fittest means to attain them: but the self-existing and independent being always uses the properest means for the producing of any effect §; therefore the self-existing and independent being has the knowledge of the ends

* Def. 4.
L. 2.
† Def. 3.
L. 2.
‡ Prop. 22.
of this.
§ Prop. 24.
of this.

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most proper to be attained, and of the fittest means to attain them, and constantly determines to attain the most proper ends by the fittest means; but the knowledge of the ends most proper to be attained, and of the means fittest to attain them, with the constant determination to attain those ends by those means is wisdom *. Therefore, *the self-existing and independent being is possessed of wisdom; which was to be demonstrated.*

* Def. 4.
of this.

FROM

PRO-

PROPOSITION. XXVI.

THEOREM XXVI.

The self-existing and independent being is possessed of justice.

BECAUSE the self-existing and independent being constantly uses the most proper means for producing of any effect^{*}; therefore ^{*Prop. 24. of this.} the self-existing and independent being constantly makes the application of power in the most fitting manner, for the most proper end, or the self-existing and independent being constantly exerts power according to wisdom; but the constant exercise of power according to wisdom, or the constant

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† Def. 5.
of this.

constant application of power in the most fitting manner for the most proper end is justice†. Therefore, *the self-existing and independent being is possessed of justice*; which was to be demonstrated.

From the seventh, fourteenth, and twenty first propositions of this book it is demonstrated, that the self-existing and independent being, which from eternity did, and to eternity will exist, is the primary cause of bringing into existence every being that ever did or can exist, that on him the continuation of their existence depends, and that he is the primary cause of terminating the existence of every being that ever did or will terminate in its existence; and also from the
twenty

twenty second, twenty fourth, twenty fifth, and twenty sixth propositions it is demonstrated, that the self-existing and independent being constantly uses the most proper means for producing of any effect, that he is possessed of knowledge, wisdom, and justice.

That self-existing and independent being, which from eternity did, and to eternity will exist, who is an active being, and all of whose powers or qualities are infinite, and incapable of any change or mutation, who determines, wills, and thinks; who is possessed of power, knowledge, wisdom, justice, &c. who brought matter, and all other beings that ever did or can exist, into existence, upon whom